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ABSTRACT 
It was around the beginning of November 2006. I was reading a book by Prof. Koen De 
Feyter World Development Law where I first see the term ‘indigenous peoples’. Two of 
the cases summarized in the book had taken my attention, i.e., the case of Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni indigenous community of Nicaragua, and Ogoni people of Nigeria.  
The cases were brought at different regional human right courts of America and Africa, 
respectively. However, both cases involved TNCs complicity in human rights violations 
of indigenous communities namely, Sol del Caribe S.A. (SOLCARSA) in Nicaragua, and 
Royal Shell in Nigeria. Both allegations were also brought against the respective states. I 
keep wondering why the TNCs escape liability which becomes the basic research 
question for this thesis. 
 
The thesis is a critical legal analysis of TNCs human rights liability from the perspective 
of indigenous peoples human rights violations. The study analyses the problematic 
situation of TNCs liability in existing state-centered system of international law. It 
observes the particular weakness of the current system of international law when the 
human rights victims of TNCs happened to be indigenous peoples.  
 
The study also analyses the effectiveness of different attempts made by international 
organization, corporations and civil society groups towards imposing human rights 
liability on TNCs. Despite the lack of legal bite and enforceability, the study founds the 
lack of sensitivity to indigenous peoples human rights in such emerging regulatory and 
voluntary initiatives which are categorized broadly as soft-laws, self-regulations and 
social initiatives. 
 
This study argues for a binding international law on TNCs as an ultimate solution, but it 
also equally argues for increased concern to indigenous peoples human rights as an 
indispensable issue in corporate human rights discourse. In this regard the thesis offers 
some general and transitional policy measures. 
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CHAPTER 1. MAPPING THE STUDY  
1.1. Introduction 
 
Human rights have been the concern of the international community for half a century. 
However, different strategies have developed through time to achieve the ultimate goal of 
human rights protection. Particularly, in the last few decades, due to the increased global 
reach of Transnational Corporations [hereafter TNCs], the focus of human rights has 
expanded from abusive governments to business enterprises. The focus of human rights 
has also expanded from individuals to collective rights. In this regard the human rights of 
indigenous peoples is a remarkable dynamic in the realm of international law. This thesis 
is, thus, the intersection point between these two dynamics of international law. What is 
the situation of indigenous peoples human rights in the context of TNCs business 
operation in lands and territories occupied by indigenous peoples is examined in this 
study. 
 
While not all TNCs are abusive of human rights, some communities including indigenous 
peoples are more susceptible than others. However, if TNCs are implicated in human 
rights violations of indigenous peoples, the threshold question will be is the current 
international law capable of regulating such human rights abusive acts of TNCs. 
 
In fact, international law for long has been dealing with the activity of states and not 
private actors including TNCs. it does not, however, mean that private actors have never 
been regulated by international law. It is rather about the mechanics of international law 
which imposes direct human rights obligations on states and the later intern regulate the 
private actors operating in their jurisdiction. What is wrong then with system of 
international law when it comes to regulating TNCs is the milestone question considered 
in this study. 
 
On the other hand, a number of stakeholders including intergovernmental organizations 
such as the United Nations (UN), International Labor Organization (ILO) and 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); human rights Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch; the academia; 
consumers; affected communities such as in Ecuador, Burma and Indonesia; and TNCs 
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themselves have taken various actions. Such actions range from imposition of human 
rights norms on TNCs – reporting of human rights abuses – researching on theoretical 
and philosophical challenges of imposing human rights liability on TNCs – boycotting of 
products – initiating law suits brought in United States (US) under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (hereinafter ATCA) and developing TNCs codes of conduct as a means of self-
regulations. How is the effectiveness of such various efforts in establishing TNCs human 
rights liability in general, and in satisfying the human rights protection claim of 
indigenous peoples in particular are the issues considered in this study. Nonetheless, 
emphasis has paid on the normative efforts than social measures. 
 
This chapter, thus, begins by framing the research problem, research questions and the 
hypothesis, and goes on indicating the methodology used. Then it defines the objectives 
and describes the relevancy of the study. Finally, it narrows down the focus of the study, 
and gives recognition to former works in the area through literature review. Finally, the 
chapter ended up by showing the structure of the thesis and highlighting the main issues 
approached in each chapter. 
1.2. Framing the Issue 
 
Globalization has manifested itself as a leading economic policy following the fall of the 
Berlin wall, the end of the Cold War, and the virtual disappearance of socialism.1 For the 
purpose of this study ‘globalization’ refers to “… the process by which powerful 
economic interests seek to expand their reach beyond national borders, moving towards 
global reach”2 or “the accelerated internationalization of the world economy”.3 Both 
definitions highlight two important social processes of ‘internationalization’ and 
‘privatization’ in which international business has accelerated. TNCs became the main 
global actors by taking control of businesses which need big capital investment and 
formerly controlled by governments.4 The accelerated force of globalization was also 
supported by factors such as trade liberalization, the rapid increase of stakeholders and 
                                                 
1 Chandler. 2003: 22 
2 Eide. 2000: 27  
3 Chandler. 2003: 22 
4 See Salazar. 2004: 124-126; see also Sullivan. 2003: 22 
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the growth on communication technology which all played great role in facilitating TNCs 
driven economy.5  
 
Besides the lack of a precise definition and consistent choice of terminology; the term 
‘transnational corporations’ is preferred here being aware of the other terms such as 
‘multinational corporations’, ‘international companies’, ‘multinational enterprises’, 
‘global corporations’ primarily because it has long been the term of choice within the 
system of the UN. I also adopt the definition provided by the UN Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights [hereafter UN Norms] that a TNC is “an economic entity 
operating in more than one country or a cluster of economic entities operating in two or 
more countries – whatever their legal form, whether in their home country or country of 
activity, and whether taken individually or collectively.”6  
 
The activities of TNCs are affecting, both positively and negatively, every part of 
individuals’ life and in many cases, particularly in the south,7 to the same extent or more 
than the activities of governmental entities. This study focuses on indigenous people as 
one of the most vulnerable groups for human rights abuses by TNCs particularly of those 
engaged in the extractive sector. This does not mean that TNCs implication in human 
rights violations are limited to sectors that have received the most attention to date such 
as extractive and manufacturing sectors. As indicated by the findings of a very recent 
study made by Human Rights Watch, “the activities of all types of businesses – large and 
small, domestic and international, public and private – in all sectors can implicate human 
rights.”8 Nor does it mean that indigenous peoples are the only victims of TNCs. TNCs 
abuses vary from labor rights such as the use of slave labor in Burma, child labor in 
                                                 
5 See Salazar. 2004: 124-126 
6 UN Norms. 2003. Parag. 20 
7 The ‘North – South’ division in this study is used as analytical concept which categorize the entire 
developed world as North and all the so-called the developing world in the South irrespective of the factual 
geographical location. Terms such as developing and developed countries are also used interchangeably. 
See for detail understanding of the North-south discourse Hall. 1992: 276-330  
8 See Human Rights Watch. 2008: 48-49 
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Malaysia, dangerous working condition in Asia, and intimidation of trade unionists in 
Costa Rica; to consumers’ rights abuses such as the baby milk and cigarettes.9  
 
The transnational nature and their big capital involvements are, however, the most 
significant characters and sources of the current regulatory challenge. According to the 
2000 UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, there were 33,000 
parent TNCs having about 690,000 foreign affiliates.10 In six years, they have reached 
77,000 with more than 770,000 foreign affiliates.11 This number has increased very 
speedily in a year time and reached 78,000 parent TNCs with 780,000 foreign affiliates in 
2007.12 This highest extraterritorial expansion and global reach of TNCs poses a 
regulatory challenge that states-based classical international law remains ineffective to 
govern TNCs. 
 
TNCs expansion has also a particular North – South trend, and such premise specially 
holds true with regard to TNCs engaged in the extractive industrial sectors. As pointed 
out by UNCTAD, “some developing and transition economies are among the main 
producers and net exporters of various minerals, while developed countries and fast-
growing emerging economies are the major consumers and importers.”13 An increased 
share of developing and transition economies in hosting TNCs in the extractive sectors 
has also observed in the last two decades.14 The implication is that many TNCs are 
operating in lax regulatory regimes of the south where human rights in general have got 
little attention let alone specific rights of indigenous peoples. 
 
The relative flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) also follows a similar North – 
South pattern. According to UNCTAD report, despite the rising of south – south FDI 
flows, TNCs from developed countries remained the leading sources of FDI accounting 
for 84% of the global out flows; US go in front and followed by European states notably 
France, Spain and United Kingdom (UK).15 The high demand of FDI in host states, many 
                                                 
9 See a comprehensive analysis of different human rights impacts of TNCs such as rights to security of the 
person, economic and social rights, civil and political rights, labor rights etc in Human Rights Watch. 2008. 
10 UNCTAD. 2006: 6 
11 UNCTAD. 2006: 1-2 
12 See UNCTAD. 2007: 11 
13 UNCTAD. 2007: 23 
14 See UNCTAD. 2007: 24 
15 UNCTAD. 2007: 8-13 
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of which are developing countries, together with other detrimental factors such as the 
debt crisis and bad-governance, has the implication that many governments may give 
priority to TNCs investment even at the expense of human rights. 
 
On the other hand, some TNCs happen to have more economic control than political 
entities. For instance, the 2003 sales of the world’s biggest corporations Wal-Mart 
(US$256 Billion) was larger than the economies of all but world’s thirty richest 
countries.16 Its sales per day are also greater than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
thirty-six countries.17 Hence, TNCs happened to be powerful economic actors than states, 
and taking in to consideration the current fusion of power in economy with power in 
politics,18 TNCs become even powerful political actors. This great economic power of 
TNCs which even exceeds the economy of many developing countries has posed a 
particular challenge in the regulatory and barging power of many developing countries 
which host TNCs’ investment in their territories. Hence, even if developing states 
happened to be willing to protect the human rights of their people including indigenous 
peoples human rights, their capability to effectively regulate such powerful TNCs is put 
under scrutiny. 
1.3. Hypothesis and Research Questions 
 
The primary hypothesis of the thesis is that the current international law has little space to 
regulate the human rights behaviors of TNCs which is a contemporary challenge on the 
very essence of the international human rights framework. It then argues that for lack of 
sensitivity of emerging regulatory regimes towards human rights of indigenous peoples, 
they have left of little redress. Based on this hypothesis, ‘where is the liability of TNCs 
for their complicity in human rights violations of indigenous peoples?’ is the central 
research question of the thesis. However, it also raises the questions that: what is the legal 
status of indigenous peoples human rights under international law? What is the human 
rights impact of TNCs on indigenous peoples? Do TNCs have human rights liability 
under international law? Are the emerging regimes capable of regulating TNCs and how 
sensitive they are towards indigenous peoples human rights? 
                                                 
16 Alston. 2005:17 
17 Alston. 2005:17 
18 See Stephens. 2002: 45  
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1.4. Methodology 
 
The study primarily builds on regress legal analysis of existing international human rights 
system with regard to TNCs liability and an extensive literature review of many articles 
of legal scholars published in different human rights journals and books. For greater 
access, different universities and international organizations, public libraries, databases 
and internet sources are consulted. Among from the list are: UN Head Quarters New 
York Library, New York University School of Law, New York Public Research 
Libraries, and Pennsylvania, Drexel University are consulted. Access to Drexel and all 
the New York libraries is the product of my exposure to New York through the internship 
programme which I participated at the UNPFII. 
  
Second, the thesis is supported by different discussion and working papers of consecutive 
four conferences held recently in 2006 on TNCs liability for human rights, and reports of 
high officials such as John Gerard Ruggie – the SRSG for Business and Human Rights; 
and Rodolfo Stavenhagen – UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples. 
 
Third, the thesis is also benefited from my participation in a seminar made with the 
Special Rapporteur Stavenhagen held at the UN Head Quarters, New York during the 
duration of my internship at UNPFII.  
 
Last but not least, this thesis is not a product of pure theoretical discussions. Rather three 
empirical cases are analyzed for better understanding of the human rights cost of TNCs 
and nature of TNCs complicity in indigenous peoples human rights violations. 
1.5. Objectives & Relevancy 
 
The thesis primarily intended to indicate the short hands of contemporary system of 
international law in imposing human rights liability on TNCs. It then aims to indicate the 
complexity of the problem when the human rights danger of TNCs happened to be on 
indigenous peoples whose rights are often invisible in the state system. Finally, the study 
has intended to indicate the lack of concern for indigenous peoples human rights in the 
global effort towards establishing human rights liability of TNCs.   
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This study is significant in bringing to the fore the issue of indigenous peoples human 
rights and TNCs as an agenda that needs a particular concern in the whole effort of 
establishing corporate human rights liability. It is a small contribution in the whole big 
debate of corporate liability for human rights; however, it is directly relevant to all 
stakeholders in the area.  
 
First, it strengths indigenous people struggle for recognition as a distinct people and 
support their call for collective human rights protection through analyzing international 
human rights standards of special importance to indigenous peoples. Second, it reminds 
states of their repeated failure of discharging their responsibility of human rights 
protection and often their implication in human rights violations of their people in 
collision with private actors, and gives a wake up call for better commitment. Third, the 
study shows the multidimensional human rights costs of TNCs operation on indigenous 
peoples land and territory and hence gives a warning of no more tolerance for their 
implications. Fourth, the study gives a new insight of advocacy for NGOs, organizations 
and individuals working on the field of corporate human rights responsibility through 
emphasizing the particular human rights threat indigenous peoples face. Fifth, through 
analyzing the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the current international legal system to 
impose human rights liability on TNCs, the study reflects the need for new dimensions of 
international human rights liability which can goes beyond a state and address directly 
TNCs. Last, this study is a contribution for all human beings who believe in greatest 
protection of human rights and equal respect for all. 
1.6. Focus of the Study 
 
This study cannot pretend to be comprehensive covering all the issues related to the 
liability of TNCs towards the human right violations of indigenous peoples as it is limited 
both in time and space. Both the issue of TNCs liability on the area of human right and 
the human rights of indigenous people as collective rights are very complex issues 
demanding a dynamic international law and international human rights law. Hence, it will 
be difficult if not impossible to exhaust these new developments in this thesis.  
 
To begin with, as indicated in the title the subject of the study focuses on indigenous 
peoples human rights issues, rather than human rights in general, and only on TNCs 
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excluding any other forms of corporations or business enterprises. Second, except some 
domestic and regional law developments considered to demonstrate and/or support the 
issue at hand, the theoretical aspect of the study is restricted to the domain of 
international law, and international human rights law. My approach focuses on 
international law because TNCs are current international actors operating in a minimum 
of more than two countries’ jurisdiction, and the domestic law of one country is 
inadequate to govern TNCs. Hence, it is necessary to have international standards for 
international actors is the idea behind it.  
 
Third, despite the lack of consensus regarding whether criminal, civil or administrative 
liability is the best way of establishing corporate liability,19 this thesis focuses only on 
civil liability aspect of TNCs excluding the rest. Last, unlike the case of ‘corporate 
responsibility’ which refers to “any attempt to get corporations to behave responsibly on 
a voluntary basis, out of either bottom-line consideration”,20 this study focuses on ‘TNCs 
liability’ interchangeably used with ‘accountability’ in some literatures. Corporate 
responsibility is a broad ethical theory consisting of core issues of good governance, good 
citizenship and social responsibility.21 Nevertheless, the theory of ‘corporate liability’ or 
‘accountability’ analyzes the existence of a legal basis of obligations which will entail 
legal remedies in case of breach.22 TNCs liability for their complicity in violations of 
indigenous peoples human rights is analyzed in this thesis under such legal terms. 
1.7. Literature Review 
 
Both corporate liability for human rights and the human right of indigenous people are 
relatively new subjects in the international human right arena developed in the 1970s. In 
fact since the 1920s when the movement on corporate responsibility for human rights 
began, it has counted more than half a century.23 Nevertheless, the first strong wave of 
corporate liability initiatives are made in the 1970s as reflected by the emergence of 
OECD Guideline for Multinational Enterprises (1976); ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977); and the UN 
                                                 
19 See different lines of arguments in this regard in Ruggie. 2006: 18-19 
20 Clapham. 2006: 195   
21 See the detail in Addo. 1999: 19-22 
22 Clapham. 2006: 195 
23 See Blumberg. 2000 – 2001: 297 
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Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations (1986). The advocacy in the 1970s 
and even in the early 1990s was mainly focused on the impact of corporations on the 
physical environment, labor and employment rights rather than their impact on the human 
rights of communities and peoples living in the areas of operation.24
  
In the last decade of the 20th century, however, as part of the ‘positive engagement of 
business’, human rights of affected communities has become the agenda.25 This 
expansion of paradigm can mainly be the result of increased concerns on the impacts of 
globalization, and the record of high profile devastated human rights abuses such as Shell 
operation on Ogonie land Nigeria, Exxon in Myanmar Burma, Texaco in Oriente 
Ecuador, Freeport-McMoran in Papua New Guinea Indonesia, etc.  The involvement of 
big human right NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and 
Survival International in reporting such devastated human rights violations by TNCs has 
contributed in exposing TNCs’ human rights behavior to the general public. Highly 
visible court cases have also appeared at different regional courts and national 
jurisdictions such as US and UK. The Awas Tingni Case (1998) brought at the Inter 
America Court of Human Rights, the Ogoni case (1996) at the African Commission on 
Human and peoples Rights and ATCA cases are notable once.  
  
Following company’s disaster lots of researches and scholarly articles also flourish 
dealing on the nature and scope of liability of TNCs for human right protection and 
promotion. The whole volume of Human Rights Standards and the Responsibility of 
Transnational Corporations edited by Addo (1999), Liability of Multinational 
Corporations under International Law edited by Kamminga & Zia-Zarifi (2000), Human 
Rights and Private Enterprise: With an Emphasis on Companies Operating Abroad 
edited by Stokke et al (2000), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights edited by 
Frynas & Pegg (2003) and very recently the volume on Transnational Corporations and 
Human Rights edited by De Schutter (2006) provide rigorous legal analysis on corporate 
                                                 
24 See, for instance, the emerged conventions such as the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage which entered in to force by June 19, 1975 which is replaced by its 1992 Protocol as 
amended in 2000, European Union Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment of June 21, 1993, and African Union Bamako Convention on the Ban of 
Import into Africa and the Control of Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes 
within Africa which opened for signature by June 30, 1990. See also Chandler. 2000: 7-8 
25 See Chandler. 2000: 8-10 
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liability for human rights violations and problemtize the TNCs liability agenda under 
international law with no particular attention to indigenous people human rights. Others 
such as the volume on Human Rights and the Oil Industry edited by Eide et al. (2000) 
mentioned indigenous people’s victimization just to illustrate the issue at hand. 
  
The second half of the 1990s is also considered as the revival of the initiative on 
corporate liability for human rights due to the emergence of improvements in 
international instruments such as the Revised 2000 OECD Guidelines, and two 
international developments, namely, the Global Compact (1999) and the UN Norms on 
the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises 
(2003).26 Still the debate on corporate human rights responsibility is on-going at different 
national and international forums.27
 
On the other hand, researches on human rights of indigenous peoples flourish mainly 
since the 1990s. Indigenous peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights edited by 
Pritchard (1998); Roulet’s (1999) Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Handbook 
on the UN System; Thornberry’s (2002) Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights; 
International Human Rights in the 21st Century: Protecting the Rights of Groups edited 
by Lyons & Mayall (2003), and Anaya’s (2004) Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
are among the remarkable research developments dealing on the human right of 
indigenous peoples as new dimension of group rights under international human rights 
law. Nevertheless neither of them has paid emphasis on the challenging situation of 
indigenous people human rights and TNCs business operation. 
 
As I have learned from the intensive study I made on the thematic issues of different 
sessions of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (UNWGIP) 
and UNPFII during my internship in the later; the impact of large-scale or major 
                                                 
26 See De Schutter. 2006: 9-10 
27 Just to mention some: four international workshops were convened by the year 2006 alone, the 1st held at 
Chatham House (The Royal Institute of International Affairs) in London (15 June) on ‘the potential uses of 
extraterritorial legislation and civil litigation against TNCs; the 2nd convened in Oslo hosted by the Council 
of Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Funds (23-24 Oct.) ‘on political, legal and ethical 
perspectives on corporate complicity in human rights violations’; the 3rd held at Brussels (3 & 4th of Nov.) 
on ‘extraterritorial territorial legislation as a means to improve the accountability of transnational 
corporations for human rights violations’, and the 4th convened at New York university school of law (17 
Nov.) on issue of ‘attributing human rights responsibilities to corporations under international law’. The 
findings are summarized in Ruggie. 2006.  
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development projects on the human rights and fundamental freedom of indigenous 
peoples have been repeatedly pointed out by indigenous representatives. There are also 
country based reports made by the Special Rapproteur Stavenhagen – on major 
development projects and their impact on the lives and livelihood of indigenous peoples 
as well as the environment.28  
  
Hence, while the debate on human rights liability of TNCs is still on-going, this study 
argues that indigenous peoples are the disproportionate bearers of the human rights cost 
of TNCs; and hence international human rights law should give special concern to the 
rights, special situations and needs of indigenous peoples in relation to TNCs liability. 
Moreover, the study is a legal analysis and a critical appraisal of soft law and voluntary 
initiatives in the area from the point of view of indigenous peoples human rights. In this 
regard the study emphasized the lack of sensitivity of emerging regulatory regimes to 
indigenous human rights and recommend indigenizing the emerging regulatory 
mechanisms.  
1.8. Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis has structured in to six chapters. While this chapter gives a general highlight 
about the whole thesis; the second chapter provides conceptual understanding about 
human rights and their special nature, and the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’. It also 
investigates the status of indigenous peoples human rights under the international legal 
framework. The third chapter is about TNCs implication in human rights violations of 
indigenous peoples, and the nature of alleged violations. The case of Texaco oil operation 
in the Ecuadorian Amazon of the Oriente, TVI Resource and others mining TNCs 
operation in Mt. Canatuan – the indigenous Subanon sacred place in Philippines, and 
Chevron et al. oil and pipeline project in Chad-Cameron crossing the indigenous land of 
the Bygali (Pygmy as often called by others) are analyzed as specific examples of TNCs’ 
implications in human rights violations of indigenous peoples.  
 
The fourth chapter addresses the contemporary regulatory challenge posed by TNCs and 
shows the more defective nature of the existing state-based international legal system 
                                                 
28 See Stavenhagen Reports. On-line available at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/sdpage_e.aspx?m=73&t=9 
Visited 30 Mar. 2008 
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when it comes to indigenous peoples human rights protection. It examines, on the one 
hand, host states ability to control TNCs, and in contrast considers the effectiveness of 
extraterritorial legislations from home states taking ATCA of US as an example. It also 
critically analyzes unjust enrichment claims and private law approach as alternative basis 
of TNCs liability.  
 
The fifth chapter questions the effectiveness and adequacy of the current global efforts, 
which are categorized broadly as soft-laws, self-regulations and social-initiatives; and 
questions the sensitivity of such emerging regulatory regimes towards indigenous peoples 
human rights. Finally, conclusions are drawn and policy considerations are provided both 
in general terms as a long term proposal and transitional measures as a short term redress. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
 
Human rights are expressed in general terms as inherent rights of all individuals and 
peoples reflecting their universality, indivisibility and interdependency. At times, 
however, human rights norms refer to specific groups of population and protect the rights 
of such groups only. This is the case, for instance, in human rights of women, children, 
migrant workers, minority groups, indigenous peoples and so on.  
 
As one can learn from the very title of this thesis, ‘indigenous peoples human rights’ is 
the basic concepts on which the research evolved. However, the very concept of the 
general ‘human rights’ and their distinguishing characters should be clear to deal with the 
specific human rights of indigenous peoples. Hence, this chapter first asks what human 
rights are and what distinguish human rights from other rights. Then it goes on the 
subjects of the research and raises the questions that who are indigenous people, and what 
makes them different from others such as minority groups. And finally it examines if 
there exists a so-called ‘indigenous peoples human rights’ under international law.  
2.1. Conceptualizing Human Rights 
2.1.1. The Notion of Human Rights  
 
As enshrined in the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
human rights are inherent to human beings and hence can neither be granted nor taken 
away by any authority whatsoever. However, human rights have been considered as 
matters of domestic law until the 20th century when they attract international concern of 
states. Hence, for the sake of enforceability and legitimacy human rights has got legal 
recognition through different international human rights instruments.  
 
The first international human rights law initiative made in 1946 with a mandate extended 
to the United Nation Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) to prepare a Universal 
Declaration inspired by, among others things, the desire to establish a comprehensive 
system for the promotion and protection of human rights, and to develop a universally 
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valid definition.29 In the course of two years the international community has reached 
agreement on the basics of human rights and came up with the UDHR.  
 
The UDHR, which consists of basic list of fundamental rights and freedoms, is an 
authoritative interpretation of the term ‘human rights’ in the UN Charter.30 Despite the 
fact that several provisions of UDHR have achieved the status of customary international 
law and therefore binding on all states, the UDHR being a declaration is non-binding 
instrument. The UDHR serves as a basis for the 1966 twin Covenants: International 
Covenant on Civil Cultural and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which together with UDHR and the 
Optional Protocol to ICCPR called the International Bill of Rights.31  
 
Needless to say, the International Bill of Rights were the beginning of binding 
international human rights law-making process in the UN system. While Subsequently 
supplemented by a number of international human rights covenants, declarations and 
‘soft-laws’;32 ICCPR, ICESCR, Convention on Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) of 1965, Convention on Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) of 1979, Convention Against Torture (CAT) of 1984, Convention on the 
Rights of Children (CRC) of 1989, and Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers 
and the Members of their Families (CRMW) of 1990 are the principal and most used 
Human Rights Conventions in the realm of international human rights law.33  
 
The term ‘human rights’ in this study, thus, used as a legal concept referring to the sum 
of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and collective rights laid down in 
international human right instruments.34 The emphasis of this study on human rights is 
also not an arbitrary choice rather justified by the distinguishing characteristics of human 
rights, as discussed below, that make human rights free to be enjoyed by all human 
beings, and so are indigenous peoples. 
                                                 
29 See the detail in Nowak. 2003: 75-77 
30 Nowak. 2003: 76 
31 See the detail on the historical codification of these rights in Nowak. 2003: 79-83  
32 See all the conventions, Declaration and other relevant human rights instruments in UNHCHR web page 
www.ohchr.org  
33 See www.ohchr.org  
34 See the philosophical and descriptive definition of human rights in Nowak. 2003:1 
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2.1.2. The Basic Characteristics of Human Rights 
 
Even if the international community has reached agreement on the basics of human rights 
within two decades, identifying the characteristics was a forty years long journey. In the 
1993 Vienna World Conference human rights are declared as ‘universal’, ‘indivisible’ 
and ‘interdependent’ and ‘interrelated’.35 Based on these basic characteristics the 
‘fundamental’ and ‘inalienable’ natures of human rights are deducted and serve as 
additional distinguishing factors. All these six characteristics are yet far from consensus 
but still stand out through criticisms.36
1. The Universality of Human Rights: It means in the one hand that human rights are 
equally possessed by all human beings as envisaged in the UDHR that “everyone 
is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”37 On the 
other hand, the universality principle is a reflection of the universal normative 
values recognized by roughly 200 countries of the world which had participated in 
the Vienna World Conference.38  
2. The Indivisibility, Interrelated and Interdependency of Human Rights: It means 
that human rights are so connected in nature and the neglect in one category of 
such rights has detrimental impact on others. Hence, it calls for “a fair and equal” 
treatment of all human rights in “the same footing, and with the same 
emphasis.”39  
3. The Fundamental Nature of Human Rights: Human rights are fundamental in the 
sense that they are of basic needs, as opposed to ‘mere wants’, which cannot be 
denied by any person or institution.40 They are also fundamental as they set only 
the minimum standards which should be met by all.41 
                                                 
35 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 1993. Art. 5 
36 See Nowak. 2003: 3 
37 UDHR. 1948. Art. 2. Currently the universality of human rights is challenged by the theory of ‘cultural 
relativism’ according to which human rights should be cultural specific rather than universal. See this 
debate in Weston. 2006: 27-38 
38 Nowak. 2003: 3 
39 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. 1993.  Art. 5 
40 Sullivan. 20003: 71-72 
41 Sullivan. 2003: 72-73 
 - 15 -  
4. The Inalienable Nature of Human Rights: Human rights exist independent of a 
codification by a specific state, and this characteristic distinguishes them from 
positive laws which are subject to the wills of the legislator to exist.42 In addition, 
the inalienable nature of human rights has two practical implications that any 
authority cannot take away these rights from their possessors and also any 
possessor of such rights can not legally give away them by consent.43  
 
These set of basic characteristics distinguish human rights from other values and justify 
their normative power. In general, human rights are high-priority claims that every 
human being can fairly claim from other people, social institutions or government as a 
matter of justice.  
2.2. Identifying the Subjects of the Study 
 
While the first part of this section devoted to define who indigenous peoples are so as to 
avoid an ideological confusion with either minority or tribal groups; the second part will 
explore if there is a legally recognized indigenous human rights in the realm of 
international law as the whole theory of ‘liability’ cannot stand tenable without the pre-
existence of legally recognized human rights.  
2.2.1. Describing Indigenous Peoples 
 
Worldwide, indigenous peoples account over 370 million, divided in to at least 500 
groups and dispersed in more than 70 countries.44 They occupy only 20% of the world’s 
land surface but consist of and nurture about 80% of the world’s cultural and biological 
diversity.45 Indigenous peoples live in all continents of the world engaged in various 
means of livelihoods from reindeer herders in the Arctic to traditional hunter-gatherers in 
forests of Amazon and Congo to subsistence farmers in many Latin American countries 
and the Pacific Cost to pastoralist in many African countries.46 Despite their diversity 
they have considerable similarity in the ‘structural positions’ they hold within very 
different nation-states. As discussed by Saugestad – Professor and Head of Department of 
                                                 
42 Sullivan. 2003: 73-74 
43 Sullivan. 2003: 73-74 
44 IWGIA. 2006: 1 
45 See University of Minnesota Human Rights Center. 2003. 
46 See IWGIA. 2007. 
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Anthropology at University of Tromsø – indigenous peoples shared in common the fate 
of marginalization, discrimination, dispossession and neglect or in short the history of 
injustice.47
 
Besides its universal application,48 there is no global consensus about a single final 
definition of the term ‘indigenous peoples’. This is not only due to lack of agreement 
between states but also is the preference of indigenous representatives as a precise 
definition would be disadvantage than advantage.49 Considering the diversity of 
indigenous peoples any specific definition may have the effect of excluding some 
indigenous groups from the category.50 A strict definition may also serve as excuse for 
governments not to recognize indigenous peoples in their jurisdiction.51 Hence, no legal 
definition of indigenous peoples is either necessary or desirable remains a prevailing 
view.52  
 
To date the one proposed by Jośe Martínez Cobo – the Special Rapporteur of the UN 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities – on the 
first-ever UN study concerning indigenous peoples: Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination and Protection Against Indigenous Populations is the most 
comprehensive and most cited description of indigenous peoples. According to Cobo: 
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invention and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing in those territories or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant 
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future 
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their 
continues existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
ocial institutions and legal systems.53s
  
Cobo’s description, thus, came up with the following characteristics as measures of 
‘indignity’ emphasizing special attachment to land as a primary marker: historical 
                                                 
47 See Saugestad. 2001: 46-47 
48 In fact different terminologies referring to these group of peoples used in different parts of the world such 
as ‘Aboriginals’ in Australia, ‘First Nations’ in Canada, ‘Native Indians’ in USA; however within the 
system of the United Nations and other international organizations working on indigenous issues such as 
ILO, ‘indigenous peoples’ is the preferred term that gets uniform application at the international fora.  
49 Meijknecht. 2001: 73 
50 Meijknecht. 2001: 73 
51 ACHPR Report. 2005: 87 
52 ACHPR Report. 2005: 87 
53 Cobo. 1986. Add. 1-4. 
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continuity, distinctiveness, non-dominancy and cultural preservation. Analytically 
speaking, thus, the term ‘indigenous peoples’ refers to both the descendants of the native 
inhabitants of a country or region as well as those people who live in the above 
prescribed positions but whose ancestors do not necessarily pre-date other inhabitants of 
a given county or region. These elements are also fundamental in the sense that they help 
to distinguish indigenous people from other minority and tribal groups within a state.  
2.2.2. Indigenous Peoples v. Minority Groups 
 
The concept of indignity both in its literary and analytical understanding is less 
complicated in the context of those states where colonialist remain there and still control 
the main economic, political and social powers as is the case in North America, Australia, 
and even in some Central and South American Countries. It is also less challenging issue 
in less diversified societies such as Scandinavian countries. However, due to the highest 
variety of tribalism and ethnicity, and taking in to consideration the post-colonial society 
where the colonists left the continents and the rest of the people were there before 
colonialism, who are indigenous peoples in the African and Asian context is the most 
appealing issues in indigenous discourse.54  
  
Often arguments forwarded from the Asian and African group suggest that the term 
‘minorities’ is more appropriate than ‘indigenous peoples’ particularly in the context of 
the two continents.55 Even if distinguishing minorities from indigenous peoples and vice 
versa is not an easy task; still there are remarkable differences between the two in their 
defining elements as well as in the rights they are aspiring to suggesting that we have to 
stick to the term ‘indigenous peoples’. 
 
Primarily, while indigenous people have historical continuity from their ancestors to 
present, which can be manifested through occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part 
of them; common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands; culture in general, 
or in specific manifestations and so on;56 minorities may not have such connections. 
Indigenous peoples are also first peoples in the areas where they reside in the sense of 
                                                 
54 See the issues concerning the concept of ‘indignity’ in Africa in Saugestad. 2001: 52-54 and the 
controversy in Asia in Kingsbury. 1998: 416-419 
55 See ACHPR Report. 2005: 95  
56 See UNPFII. 2004: 2  
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time immemorial or at least prior to the majority living there, while immigrant group of 
people in a certain country may constitute a minority regardless of their time of arrival.  
  
Second, the socio-economic and political non-dominancy within the majority system can 
be a common character of both indigenous peoples and minority groups. Since minority 
is always a relative term which refers back to a majority; non-dominancy in terms of 
numerical values, i.e., small in number suffices to be a minority.57 However, indigenous 
peoples vary from numerically small in number like the case in Argentina (3-5%), 
Colombia (3.4%) to the majority in Guatemala (60%) and Bolivia (62%).58 Regardless of 
their number they all are non-dominant in relation to the structural position they assume 
in the state system.  
 
Third, the ‘distinctiveness’ criterion for minorities is related to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic nature.59 However indigenous people are distinct due to their special way of 
life which is prominently related to their special attachment to the ancestral land and 
territory.60 Distinctiveness should be both objective and subjective, i.e., the peoples 
should identify themselves as indigenous and also considered distinct by others.61 It has 
also internal character in that an individual who identify himself/herself as belonging to a 
particular indigenous group should also be accepted by that group as such.62
  
Besides its theoretical significance, the distinction between indigenous peoples and 
minority groups serves a legal purpose. Qualifying a group as a minority instead of 
indigenous peoples has different legal consequence under international human rights law. 
For instance, while indigenous people claim collective human rights as a people, the 
claim of minority groups as reflected in the wordings of some articles of ICCPR as 
                                                 
57 Even though the purely numerical criterion for minorities is controversial, it is generally accepted as a 
significant element so long as it is measured in terms of the entire state rather than a single province where 
they reside. See the detail in Meijknecht. 2001:77-79; see also Fresa. 2000: 2-4 
58 See IWGIA. 2007.  
59 See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic or Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities. 1992. 
60 See the Preamble of UNDRIP. 2007. While the notion of special historical attachment to the land is a 
vital element even in the etymology of the word ‘indigenous’ itself , it has posed a particular challenge to 
‘indignity’ in the African context which lead to the claim that all Africans are indigenous. See Gilbert. 
2006: xv (15) about the origin of the term ‘indigenous’. See also the detail of the debate in Africa in 
Saugusted. 2001: 52-54 
61 According to ILO-169 Art 1(2) Self identification is considered as fundamental criterion for indignity 
and to benefit from the convention. See the detail discussion on this criterion in Meijknecht. 2001: 87-89. 
62 UNPFII. 2004: 2  
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“rights of persons belonging to minorities” is individualistic.63 Besides, while the basic 
claim of indigenous peoples is to continue as a distinct people (separatist policy),64 the 
claim of minority groups is to gain de facto and de jure equality with the majority and to 
integrate within the majority (integrationist approach).65
  
The whole analysis, however, is not to indicate the existence of clear cut boundary 
between the two. In fact there is the possibility of overlapping. Some indigenous peoples 
are minorities like the case of the Sámi in Scandinavian and vise versa. But not all 
minorities are indigenous peoples or not all indigenous peoples are minority groups. The 
strict application of the defining elements to categorize groups as indigenous peoples or 
minorities would have a potential danger, just like that of a strict definition of indigenous 
peoples, of excluding some groups from the category. However, this theoretical analysis 
is useful to protect the misuse of the discourse on indigenous peoples by other groups 
who do not so qualify. Moreover, as Scheinin – Professor of Constitutional and 
International Law and Director of the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Academy 
University – argued “… the international community – which still today is primarily 
constituted of states – will not grant far reaching rights to indigenous peoples unless the 
scope of application of the legal concept of indigenous peoples is at least reasonably 
precise.”66  
 
In general, as emphasized by Cobo’s definition nativity by itself is not the most important 
element in the analytical use of the term ‘indigenous peoples’. It is rather the special 
attachment to land and the distinctiveness criteria, the later also emphasized by Art.1 of 
ILO Convention No.169 (ILO-169), which are the basic features of indignity. Besides all 
the elements of indignity are inextricably linked to their claimed rights to continue 
‘traditional’ way of life, to keep their cultural distinctiveness, to stay in their traditionally 
occupied territories and control their resources, and to exercise their rights to self-
determination.  
                                                 
63 See, for instance, ICCPR. 1966. Art.  27 
64 The separatist claim of indigenous peoples is clearly reflected by the revocation of International Labor 
Organization Convention No. 107 (ILO-107) which is condemned as perpetrating integrationist and 
assimilationist policy. See also Anaya. 2004: 58-59 
65 Meijknecht. 2002.  
66 Scheinin. 2005: 13 
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2.3. Indigenous Peoples Human Rights under International Law 
 
The current movement of indigenous peoples is a legitimate claim to alleviate the 
particular form of discrimination they have faced for centuries due to their distinct 
culture, means of substance and marginalized positions. Nonetheless, it has faced serious 
resistances and skepticism at varies levels in both developed and developing nations. It 
has also faced theoretical debate under international law which distributes sovereignty 
among states. In spite of such challenges, indigenous peoples’ rights are recognized by 
some but very significant international human right instruments. Recently, it has further 
confirmed by the adoption of UNDRIP – a special declaration dealing specifically on the 
Human Rights of Indigenous peoples. This topic covers these emerging indigenous 
peoples human rights under the current international human rights law framework. 
2.3.1. Indigenous Peoples Human Rights under ILO Framework 
 
The ILO has a long history of addressing the right of indigenous peoples. The 1957 ILO 
Convention No. 107 (ILO-107) ‘Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous 
and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries’ is the firs legal 
instrument in recognizing the collective right of indigenous peoples in international 
paradigm. The intrinsic idea under ILO-107, which followed the common paternalistic 
approach of international human rights law, was that indigenous people will gradually 
extinct and absorbed by the majority population within a state.67 Due to its limitation and 
criticisms on this assimilative policy it envisages, ILO-107 is explicitly renounced in 
1989 by the subsequent Convention ILO-169 ‘Concerning the Protection of Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries’.   
  
ILO-169 remains a leading international legal instrument with the status of a convention 
that clearly defined its applicability to indigenous peoples within states.68 Compared to 
the UNDRIP, discussed under the following section, ILO-169 is less generous in 
recognizing the right to territorial control but put the first landmark in recognizing 
                                                 
67 See Anaya. 2004: 58-59 
68 Note that ‘convention’, ‘treaty, ‘protocol’, ‘covenant’, ‘charter’, ‘accord’ and ‘agreement’ are common 
terminologies used interchangeably under international law to refer to legally bindings instruments through 
states’ act of adoption/ratification, or accession/succession. And it is only conventions that would be open 
for ratification by states, and other declarations would be open only for vote to be adopted. 
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indigenous peoples rights to land. While Art.13 gives protection to indigenous land rights 
in relation to their cultural and spiritual connection to it; Art.15 goes further and 
recognizes indigenous peoples rights to participate in the use, management and 
conservation of natural resources.  
   
According to the classical land law conception, “cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum 
et useque ad inferos – the owner of the soil owns up to heavens and down to the depth.”69 
However, Art.15 has no reference to rights of ownership rather recognize the right to 
participate in the use, management and conservation of natural resources, such as flora 
fauna, freshwater areas, sea ice, minerals and other sub-surface resources, located in 
indigenous territories. This provision is in fact smart in avoiding the complex legal issue 
of right of ownership but criticized as inefficient in the factual situation of most 
developing countries where sub-surface resources are owned by the government and it 
has left indigenous peoples only with the right to be consulted.  
  
ILO-169 also came up with the standard of ‘free prior and informed consultation’ of 
indigenous peoples which shall be undertaken ‘in good faith and with the objective of 
achieving consent’.70 ILO-169 also remains a significant legal instrument in protecting 
indigenous peoples traditionally occupied, used, owned land, territory and resources as 
long as there is continuation as reflected by the phrase ‘traditionally occupy’ under 
Art.14(1). 
 
As of January 2007, ILO-169 has ratified only by 23 countries lead by Denmark, Fiji, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and Spain; and followed by additional 18 countries including 
13 Latin America countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominica, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.71 
The increased ratification of the convention, even if at a very slow pace, particularly by 
those countries in Latin America and the Pacific, where indigenous human rights are 
seriously violated for almost half a century following the Spanish conquest, is a sign of 
                                                 
69 Gilbert. 2006: 105 
70 See the cumulative readings of ILO-169. 1989. Art 6 & 16; see also the brief analysis of such concept in 
Anaya. 2004: 153-156 
71 See http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/62.htm Visited 14 Apr. 2008 
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growing acceptance of the international community on indigenous human rights.72 It will 
also strengthen the legacy of its status as customary international law which is already 
argued by human rights scholars such as Anaya – Professor of Human Rights and Policy 
at University of Arizona and the newly appointed UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom of Indigenous Peoples.73  
2.3.2. Indigenous Peoples Human Rights under UNDRIP 
 
In 1982 the Working Group on Indigenous Population (WGIP), the world’s largest 
human rights forum in which more than 200 Indigenous organizations participated and 
the first and only UN body involved exclusively with matters concerning the human 
rights of indigenous peoples, was formed as a subsidiary organ of the Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights.74 WGIP has composed of five 
independent experts drawn from the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, the current Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Minorities (hereinafter the Commission) primarily charged with the 
preparation of a Draft Declaration.75 In 1994 the WGIP experts completed ‘the UN Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ and unanimously recommended to the 
Commission which in turn passed to the General Assembly on June 2006 by a vote of 30 
in favor, 2 against and 12 abstentions.76  
 
The Draft Declaration has been debated for more than two decades and finally adopted by 
13th of September 2007 by affirmative vote of 143 states. Only four countries but with 
significant number of indigenous populations in their territory – the United States, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand – voted against it, while 11 states – Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Colombia, Georgia, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, Samoa and 
Ukraine – abstained.77 It has been commented by human rights experts that the 
                                                 
72 See the historical situations of  indigenous peoples human rights in Latin America countries in Todorov. 
1992. 
73 See Anaya. 2004: 61-96 
74 As a big deviation from the general principle of participation within the UN system, NGOs and 
indigenous organization with no ECOSOC consultancy status have participated in the WGIP. See OHCHR 
web page www.ohchr.org  
75 See www.ohchr.org
76 See www.ohchr.org
77 See www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm Visited 22 Mar. 2008 
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Declaration does not come up with new human right principles, but rather concentrated 
on indigenous peoples as such rights had, over the years, been denied to indigenous 
peoples.78 However, taking into account some nation states’ serious resistance against its 
adoption and the valuable rights it has incorporated, the UNDRIP has opened a new 
paradigm of indigenous peoples human rights in the realm of international human rights 
law.  
 
The adoption of the Declaration is “a triumph for justice and human dignity” as it is 
called by Arbour – the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights79 – or “a fundamental 
landmark for indigenous peoples which  represents their important contribution to the 
construction of the international human rights system” as expressed by Stavenhagen80 or 
“a milestone in the long and arduous march of what have come to be known as 
‘indigenous peoples’ through the major institution of organized intergovernmental 
society: the United Nations” in the words of Anaya.81  
 
The UNDRIP consists of the most prized indigenous human rights such as Art. 3 on the 
right to self-determination, even if it is the replica of the standard formulation of such a 
right contained in prior international legal instruments as commented by Stavenhagen in a 
seminar held at UN Head Quarters, New York, which I get the privileged to attend; 82 
Art. 10 on relocation which requires free and informed consent, rights to get fair and 
equitable compensation and when possible with the option to return; Art. 20 on rights to 
full participation in decisions that can affect their life; Art. 25 on the right to maintain and 
strengthen distinctive spiritual and material relationship with traditionally owned, 
occupied or used land, territory, water or resource; Art. 26 on the right to own, develop, 
control and use traditionally owned, or occupied or used land, territory or resource; Art. 
27 right to restitution in case of forced occupation, confiscation, use or damage, or at 
least right to ‘just and fair compensation’; and Art. 31 on the rights to self-determination. 
 
                                                 
78 See, for instance, the statement of Les Malezer – Chairperson of the Global Indigenous Caucus.  13 Sep. 
2007. On-line available at: www.iwgia.org. Visited 12 Apr. 2008 
79 See the statement of Arbour – High Commissioner for Human Rights. 13 Sep. 2007. on line available at: 
www.galdu.org Visited 15 Oct. 2007 
80 See Stavenhagen’s statement.  14 Sep. 2007.  
81 See Anaya’s speech. 3 Oct. 2007. On-line available at: www.law.arizona.edu. Visited 13 Jan. 2008 
82 Stavenhagen. 26 Oct. 2007. Participatory Observation in a seminar held at UN: New York. 
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The Declaration has no explicit provision on indigenous peoples’ rights concerning 
resources beneath the surface. However, Art. 30 declares the sovereign right of 
indigenous peoples in requiring states to get the prior free and informed consent of 
indigenous peoples in any “project affecting their lands, territories and other resources, 
particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources.” Hence, unlike ILO-169 which minimized indigenous peoples 
rights to consultation, the UNDRIP has emphasized on the right to consent. 
 
What is debated now is the status of the UNDRIP under international law particularly 
with regard to those states voted against it. As a basic principle on international law, a 
Declaration has no legally binding effect even on the states that have voted in favor of it 
but rely purely on the moral weight it carries. However, such moral weight has big role 
towards its development of customary international law,83 and even jus cojens - a 
peremptory norm. Moreover as Anaya argued “the name ‘Declaration’ appears to give it 
a more solemn ring, takes it closer to most important policy statements of the organized 
world community – into the vicinity of instruments such as the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.”84 Hence, the UNDRIP will exert a considerable amount 
of moral force through increasing states performance in this regard. Moreover, as 
explained by Stavenhagen, the Declaration itself is a reflection of already growing 
international consensus “concerning the content of the rights of indigenous peoples, as 
they have been progressively affirmed in domestic legislation, in international 
instruments, and in the practice of international human rights bodies.”85
 
Following the adoption of the Declaration whether it is time to work on a convention is 
the other emerging issue. In this regard, Stavenhagen has pointed out that taking in to 
consideration the current resistance against the adoption of the Declaration from states 
with significant number of indigenous peoples, i.e., USA, Australia, New Zealand, & 
Canada, and the existing lack of clarity on its implementation even among the states who 
have voted in favor of it; rushing in to a convention could weaken the power of the 
                                                 
83 Customary international law developed “… when a preponderance of states and other authoritative actors 
converge on a common understanding of the norms’ contents [opinio juris] and generally expect future 
behavior in conformity with the norms [oughtness].” Anaya. 2004: 61 
84 See Anaya’s speech. 3 Oct. 2007. On-line available at: www.law.arizona.edu. Visited 13 Jan. 2008 
85 Stavenhagen’s  Statement. 14 Sep. 2007 
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Declaration.86 The Raportture also argued that, the international community is not yet 
ready to enter into a binding obligation regarding human rights of indigenous peoples and 
hence even if the UN has come up with a convention, it would not have enough signatory 
states.87 Hence, it is rather time to deal with implementation processes at regional and 
national levels than working on a convention.  
2.3.3. Indigenous Peoples Human Rights under ICCPR & ICESCR 
 
The twin covenants ICCPR and ICESCR are equally significant international legal 
instruments protecting the human rights of indigenous peoples without mentioning any 
reference to the notion of ‘indigenous peoples’. As Scheinin argues, based on the joint 
Art I, indigenous peoples who qualify as ‘peoples’ under the notion of public 
international law, i.e., those who are ethnically, linguistically, geographically, historically 
distinct from the majority are entitled to the full right to self-determination as a people.88  
 
However, under public international law a right to self-determination is not an absolute 
right. As identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in Quebec case, self-determination 
in its extreme form of secession is allowed only in three situations. First is for former 
colonies; second is when a people oppressed, as for instance, under foreign military 
oppression or alien subjugation; and third is when a group in a state are denied 
meaningful access to the government to exercise their socio-economic and political rights 
and suffered from extreme form of exclusion.89 As justified by the Court, Succession is 
allowed in such situations because a group has been denied their right to pursue the right 
to self-determination in its other forms and secession is provided as an ultimum remedium 
or a last resort right.90
 
Hence, indigenous peoples who are capable of instituting as a people under public 
international law would have a right to self-determination including the right to 
secession, in fact up on the fulfillment of its limitations. However, indigenous peoples 
‘that did not so qualify would still have the right to self-determination’ in the form of 
                                                 
86 Stavenhagen. 26 Oct. 2007. Participatory Observation from a seminar held at UN: New York. 
87 Stavenhagen. 26 Oct. 2007 Participatory Observation from a seminar held at UN: New York. 
88 Scheinin. 2005:6 
89 See Scheinin. 2004: 11-12   
90 Scheinin. 2004: 11-13 
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effective participation, free and informed consent as well as socio-economic and political 
autonomy within a state.91 This view is also in line with the level of right to self-
determination clamed by indigenous peoples as emphasized by some of their 
representatives participated in the early 1998-1999 meetings of WGIP, and in fact, none 
of them has spoken of the right to secession.92 It should, however, be noted that there is 
still no international consensus on the legal implication of ‘indigenous peoples rights to 
self-determination’. 
 
On the other hand, are indigenous peoples beneficiaries of the cultural rights protected 
under Art. 27 of ICCPR? Some human right experts argue that all indigenous peoples are 
minorities for the purpose of Art. 27.93 However, for a group to be considered as a 
minority, among others, the numerical element is very significant. None of the working 
definitions of minority goes without mentioning the essential element of numerical 
minority as it is in the very essence of the naming ‘minority groups’ itself.94 
Nevertheless, some indigenous peoples such as in Guatemala, Bolivia, for instance, 
constitute the majority in the state and hence failed to meet one of the essential elements 
to be considered as a minority group to benefit under Art.27 of ICCPR. Thus, it is not all 
indigenous peoples that are entitled to cultural protection under Art. 27. But only those 
who are minorities in the state are the beneficiaries of this provision just the same as not 
all indigenous peoples qualify as a people under public international law to benefit from 
the common Art I of the twin covenants on rights to self-determination.  
  
To what extent does Art. 27 protect the cultural rights of indigenous peoples is the other 
issue here. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), a special body entitled to interpret the 
provisions of ICCPR, has interpreted the concept of ‘culture’ under Art. 27 in various 
broad terms. 
 
First, HRC considered culture as a particular way of life like fishing and hunting in the 
case of Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada where the Committee ruled that state exploitation 
of timber, gas and natural resources in areas traditionally used by the Band for hunting 
                                                 
91 See the broader conception of the right to self-determination in Anaya. 2004: 97-128, Scheinin. 2004: 7-
16 & Gilbert. 206:199-225   
92 See Fresa. 2000:17-18; see also Meijknecht. 2001:162 
93 See, for instance, Scheinin. 2005:6 
94 See, for instance, the description given by Meijknecht. 2001: 67-70 & Fresa. 2000. 
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and fishing will destroy through time the resource basis of traditional economic activities 
of the Band.95   
 
Secondly, culture is defined as a traditional economic activity in Kitok v. Sweden case 
where the Committee decided that reindeer herding is part of the Sámi culture and the 
government of Sweden should respect this lifestyle.96  
 
 Lastly, culture is interpreted as a right to traditional land in Länsman v. Finland No. I & 
II cases.97 While Länsman I was about the harmful effects of a stone quarry on the flank 
of the Etela-Riutusvaara Mountain and its transportation through reindeer herding 
territory of the Sámi in Finland alleged as a violation of enjoyment of culture; Länsman II 
was related to the government forest lodging activity in the reindeer herding lands of the 
same Sámi community. In Länsman I & II, thus, HRC strengthened the protection of 
traditional livelihood as a culture even if it is supported by modern techniques so long as 
it is ‘essential for the culture and necessary for its survival’.98 In Länsman cases HRC 
further developed the combined test of ‘effective participation’ and ‘sustainability’ which 
secure indigenous peoples land rights.  
 
In general, Art.27 of ICCPR is developed in the jurisprudence of HRC in a way that 
favors indigenous peoples’ rights to traditional land and territory, and means of 
subsistence as part of the fundamental right to culture. As commented by Gilbert, this 
approach to cultural rights is a new paradigm of rights that transcends the traditional 
dichotomy of international human rights as civil and political rights vis-á-vis economic, 
social and cultural rights.99
  
The UNDRIP, ICCPR, ICESCR & ILO conventions are the principal but not the only 
international legal instruments protecting the human rights of indigenous peoples. CERD, 
CRC, and CBD have also incorporated significant provisions protecting indigenous 
peoples’ right to non-discrimination; recognize various rights of indigenous children; and 
indigenous peoples traditional knowledge and resource rights, respectively. 
                                                 
95 Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada. 1984. Summarized in Scheinin. 2004:5 
96 Ivan Kitok v. Sweden. 1985. Summarized in Meijknecht. 2001:94  
97 LänsmanI et al. v. Finland. 1992 & Länsman II et al. 1995. Summarized in Meijknecht. 2001:95-98 
98 See the summary in Meijknecht. 2001: 95-98   
99 Gilbert. 2006: 116 
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2.3.4. Indigenous Peoples Human Rights under Regional Human Rights 
Instruments 
 
Apart from international legal instruments, the regional human rights systems, i.e., the 
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) have 
also significantly protect the human rights of indigenous peoples in their respective 
regions.100 Given the scope of this study in the realm of international law, I will not go in 
depth analysis of indigenous human rights protection at the regional levels. However, a 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is considered to 
emphasize the significance of these instruments beyond the regional level.101  
 
The Mayagna (Sumo) indigenous community of Awas Tingni filed a petition before 
IACHR against the government of Nicaragua alleging that the government of Nicaragua 
has not met its constitutional and international law obligations to recognize and safeguard 
the community’s rights to their lands which was degraded by granting a concession to a 
foreign company called SOLCARSA to carry out road construction work and Timber 
logging on the community land without their consent.102 The Inter-American court 
analyzed Art. 21 of the ACHR in conjunction with the constitution of Nicaragua, which 
recognizes the right to indigenous people to maintain their communal forms of land 
ownership, use and enjoyment, as well as Nicaraguan domestic legislation, which 
requires the demarcation of indigenous territories, and commented that:  
[s]ome specifications are required on the concept of property in [I]ndigenous 
communities. Among [I]ndigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition 
regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the sense that 
ownership of the land is not centered on individual but rather on the group and its 
community. 103  
 
IACHR, thus, interpreted Art. 21 of ACHR on the right to property in line with 
indigenous peoples communal property jurisprudence as opposed to the western 
                                                 
100 Despite some efforts, Asia has not yet come up with a regional human rights instrument. See De Feyter. 
2001: 262 
101 A similar jurisprudences has also developed from ACHPR in the case of Ogoni v. Nigeria summarized 
in De Feyter. 2001. 
102 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. 31 August 2001. 
103 Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua. 31 August 2001. Parag. 149 
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individual property conception.104 This judicial opinion at Awsa Tingni case contributed 
to the opinio juris – the physiological force which derive states to a certain practice or 
‘subjectivities of oughtness’105 – developing on the territorial right of indigenous peoples. 
It also puts a positive remark on states’ liability under international law for failure to 
recognize, respect and even demarcate the lands, territories and resources of indigenous 
peoples. 
 
To conclude, this chapter approached some primary questions which may pop up to the 
readers’ mind just by looking at the very title of the thesis. It defined human rights as 
inherent rights of all human beings but get their normative expression through legal 
instruments. It also underlined the importance and distinguishing character of human 
rights from other rights which entails enjoyment by all including indigenous peoples and 
call for observance by all including all state and non-state actors with no exception to 
TNCs. The chapter also described indigenous peoples as different groups from minorities 
or other tribal groups which entails sticking to the term ‘indigenous’. It highlighted 
indigenous peoples human rights recognized under some significance international 
conventions such as the ICCPR, ICESCR and ILO-168, and in fact pointed out the 
significance of the UNDRIP which joined the category of high moral value legal 
instruments like UDHR.  
                                                 
104 See the detail about indigenous peoples v. western conception of property in Anaya. 2004: 141- 148 
105 See such a concept in Anaya. 2004: 61-62 
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CHAPTER 3. TNCs COMPLICITY ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 
Having defined indigenous peoples and the status of their human rights recognized under 
existing international legal framework in the previous chapter, this chapter will proceed 
on analyzing three empirical cases to illustrate the violations of some of these rights by 
TNCs operating on indigenous peoples inhabited areas. The cases have particularly 
focused on TNCs engaged in the extractive sector and operating in the developing nations 
of Latin America, Asia and Africa. The chapter, thus, raises three basic questions that: are 
TNCs complicit to human rights violations of indigenous peoples? If so, whether states 
are implicated in such alleged violations and to what extent?  
3.1. Conceptualizing Corporate Complicity 
 
Currently ‘corporate complicity’ in human rights violations is the buzzword in the 
relatively new discourse of corporate human rights accountability. ‘Complicity’ is the 
notion of criminal law but commonly applied to indicate the potential of corporation to 
threat human rights and the consequential liability. According to Clapham & Jerbi,106 the 
notion of ‘corporate complicity’ to human rights abuses can best be understood in three 
categories: direct, indirect and silent complicity.107 Direct complicity is when a 
corporation authorized and/or intentionally participated in human right abuse by others 
often the state.108 Here the intention should not be equal to the intention to do harm but 
even knowing the likely consequences of the act suffices.109
 
A corporation can also be complicit indirectly by continuing to accrue benefit from 
human rights violations by others.110 Silence is not neutrality is the third principle. Even 
if a TNC neither directly involved nor accrues a benefit out of the situation, its failure to 
                                                 
106 Andrew Clapham is Associate Professor of Public International Law, Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Geneva; and Scott Jerbi is a senior advisor for the Ethical Globalization Initiative and was 
speechwriter for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
107 The notion of ‘corporate complicity’ is highly debated concept which lacks academic consensus as well 
as uniform company practices. But scholars more or less follow a similar fashion of classification with 
Clapham, while some add more subtypes under each of the three categories.  See Clapham & Jerbi. 2000-
2001: 340; see for detail Tófalo. 2005: 1-36   
108 See Clapham & Jerbi. 2000-2001: 342.  
109 See Clapham & Jerbi. 2000-2001: 342-46 
110 Clapham & Jerbi. 2000-2001: 346 
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attempt to influence the government to stop the alleged human rights abuses constitutes 
complicity through abstention. Chandler – the founder Chair of Amnesty International 
UK Business Group – justifies this last principle that “the UDHR, calling on all 
individuals and organs of society to support human rights, provides legitimacy for a 
company to speak out in their defense.”111  
 
The silence is not neutrality principle appeals to the whole ideological debate on the 
extent of corporate accountability for human rights. While the question should 
corporations have human rights liability is still contested, there is a growing consensus on 
corporate responsibility for human rights, at least, at less legal level or in terms of moral 
obligations.112 Whether corporations are expected simply to abstain from human rights 
violations or expected to engage in human rights protection and promotion is, however, 
the current on-going debate. It is not the purpose of this study to deal with such issues. 
However, as a matter of justice and taking into account that TNCs are business groups 
rather than human rights institutions, imposing extended obligation in this regard will not 
gain much weight.   
 
Corporate complicity in general is a wide and in depth complex notion that may include 
mere presence in human rights volatile regions and warns TNCs to be ware of the general 
human rights environment of their operations. TNCs complicity is, thus, analyzed in such 
broad terms here.  
3.2. Justifying Limitations 
 
As highlighted earlier, this chapter introduces three empirical cases each taken from the 
developing continents to illustrate the nature of indigenous peoples human rights 
violations by TNCs and the situation of increasing their vulnerability for further abuses 
by others. The cases provide examples among many cases where TNCs have allegedly 
been involved in series indigenous peoples human rights violations often in collusion 
with host state governments in the developing world. They are, thus, far from exhaustive 
and in fact subject to the following limitations. 
                                                 
111 Chandler. 2000: 14 -15 
112 Here it could be enough to mention the fact that currently about 152 companies have made explicit 
commitment to the UDHR and other human rights norms. See Business and Human Rights Resource 
Center Web Page: www.business-humanrights.org/Home Visited 9 Nov.2007. 
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First, the cases do not analyze the human rights impact of all TNCs but only those TNCs 
engaged in the extractive industrial sectors. While TNCs engaged in the extractive sectors 
such as oil, gas and mining production constituted three-thirds of the total reported cases 
of human rights abuses by TNCs;113  there exists an alarming tension between indigenous 
peoples and these extractive TNCs.114 The geological dependency – natural resource 
availability such as oil, gas, diamond, gold, copper, uranium and other minerals – of 
TNCs in the extractive sectors, the large scale and land based nature of the production has 
assumed special importance in the context of indigenous peoples attachment to their 
environment.  
  
Second, contrary to the impact of TNCs on the general human rights situation of affected 
communities, the cases focus on the human rights of indigenous peoples in general terms 
with particular focus on social categories such as children, women or elders.  The gross 
human rights impact and abuse by TNCs on different local communities, tribal groups 
and indigenous peoples has manifested through time. Indigenous peoples, however, 
disproportionately bear the human rights cost of TNCs’ operation due to inter alia their 
distinct culture and social attachment to their territories which implicate a 
multidimensional nature of the violation. The treaty bodies in their recommendations to 
state parties to protect the rights of indigenous peoples also document increased human 
rights abuse of TNCs on indigenous peoples land and territory.115
 
Third, the cases are geographically limited to developing continents of Latin America, 
Asia and Africa where indigenous peoples human rights violations or general human 
rights situations has got little weight due to other considerable factors which worsen the 
situation. TNCs complicity in human rights violations are persistent in almost all regions 
in poor and rich, developed, less developed and under developed nations with no uniform 
regional trends.116 However, as reflected in a more recent founding of the SRSG, it has 
assumed a particular north to south trend. Accordingly, since 2000 nearly all corporate 
related human rights cases were in low income countries of which almost two-thirds were 
                                                 
113 Ruggie. 2006a. Parag. 25 
114 Ruggie. 2006a. Parag. 25 
115 See Ruggie. 2007a. Parag. 72-80
116 Forest People Programme & Tebtebba Foundation. 2006: 7-8 
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either recently emerged from conflict or were still in it.117 Besides, all except two of the 
countries were below the world average based on the World Bank’s ‘rule of law’ 
standard.118
 
The resource factor is also influential here. Most indigenous peoples in the north are 
already dispossessed of their territories to the extent of treated as second citizens in their 
ancestral land as is the case in Australia,119 Canada, and US where the nations are now in 
the hands of the descendants of the colonists and other migrant peoples. Moreover, since 
the end of the 1980s, a changing focus of international mining companies has observed 
on four main areas of growth: Latin America, Asia the Pacific and Africa, where the 
highest concentration of indigenous peoples claimed to be found.120 Thus, the following 
case studies analyze TNCs complicity in violations of indigenous peoples human rights in 
the context of these developing nations. 
3.3. When TNCs Trespass Human Rights: Case Studies 
3.3.1. Oil Extraction in Oriente, Ecuador 
 
The eastern cost of Ecuadorian Amazon basin stretching from the North to the Southern 
cost is known as the Oriente. The Oriente, which encompasses over 32 million acres of 
tropical rain forests is home for eight groups of indigenous peoples – the Quichua, Shuar, 
Achuar, Cofan, Huaorani, Shiwiar, Secoya and siona – who were estimated to be 85,000 
to 250,000 (25-50 %) of the total population at the beginning of the 1990s.121
                   
                                                 
117 Ruggie. 2007b: 32 
118 See Ruggie. 2007b: 32 
119 After centuries of denial and injustice, the Australian government very recently on 13 Feb 2008 has 
issued a public apology for the historic injustice that the Aboriginals have suffered. See www.survival-
international.org  Visited 14 Feb 2008. 
120 Whiteman & Mamen. 2002: 13 
121 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 853  






















Map. 3.1. The Oriente Amazon Basin, Ecuador (colored light Blue).  
 
Since the Spanish arrival in the 16th century and followed by the conquest of 
missionaries, indigenous peoples of the Oriente have been threatened in their land. 
However, they have more threatened than ever since the early 1970s ‘oil boom’.122 In 
1967, after three years of prospecting, the US Oil giant Texaco (now ChevronTexaco 
following a merger with Chevron in 2001) has discovered commercial quantities of oil in 
Oriente.123 The extraction entered in 1972 together with Petro-Ecuador, Ecuador’s 
national oil company, on one million hectares of land in the Oriente including over 300 
wells, 29 production camps and four pipelines.124 However, within two decades the oil 
exploration has covered three million hectares carried out by Petro-Ecuador and a 
coalition of nine foreign companies: Oryx (US), Petro-Canada (UK), ARCO (US), British 
Gas (UK), Unocal (US), Elf Aquitaine (France), Occidental Exploration and Production 
Company (US), Conoco (US), and Consortium Braspetro (Brazil).125  
  
                                                 
122 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 855 
123 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 857 
124 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 857-858 
125 See Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 858-859 
 - 35 -  
The Ecuadorian Law treated large parts of the Amazonian territory which is occupied by 
indigenous peoples including the Oriente as terra nullius, which is free to occupation,126 
and continued to attract many TNCs in the area.127 By 2001 the government allowed the 
construction of a 298 miles pipeline that runs from the Oriente to Esmeraldas in the 
pacific coast, by Oleoducto de Crudos Pesados Ltd., a consortium of seven TNCs 
including Occidental Petroleum (US), Kerr McGee, Alberta Energy (Canada), Agip oil 
company (Italy), Repsol YPF (Spain), Perez Compac (South Africa), and Techint of 
Argentina.128
  
The oil exploration in Ecuador from its initial seismic studies to the final stage of 
transportation process had devastated impact on the human rights of the Oriente 
indigenous peoples.129 During the seismic studies the clearing of forests, using explosives 
to drill holes destroyed their habitats, foods and medicine; disturbed the animals as well 
as the spirit of the forest.130 The use of water resources such as lakes and rivers for 
fishing and other purposes with no regard to sacred sights as well as certain restrictions 
disrespected the indigenous culture.131 In the exploratory drilling process again the 
clearing of forests continued to build a drilling plat form which needs 2-5 hectares of land 
and up to 15% of the surrounding forests are disturbed by logging for boards to lie 
beneath the platform.132 Moreover, wells drilled on indigenous people settlement areas 
without considering the peoples shifting way of life disrupted their very means of 
subsistence.133
 
At the production stage, since oil is extracted in mixture with water and gas it should be 
                                                 
126 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 856. Under international law states can occupy any empty territory based on 
the Roman law principle of terra nullius, meaning that any uninhabited territory is open to conquest and 
can be occupied by states. ‘Terra nullius’, thus, literally means land or territory with no owner. For a 
comprehensive overview of terra nullius, see Lessaffer. 2005. 
127 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 856-857 
128 Amnesty International U.S. On-line available at: www.amnestyusa.org/business/ecuador.html Visited 
19th Jun. 2007. pp. 5 
129 See the detail about each process and the impacts on indigenous human rights in a wider perspective in 
Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 860-881 
130 See Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 860-864 
131 See Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 861 
132 See Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 862-863 
133 Until 1992, Texaco has drilled about 339 wells in over a million acre of concession land. See Lyons. 
2003-2004: 704 
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pumped to a central separation facility and then the separated oil should be sent out 
through a pipeline. In this separation process about 235, 600 million cubic feet of gas has 














Fig. 3.1.Gas burning in the separation process, Oriente: Ecuador.  
N.B. Photo by Lou Dematteis, courtesy of Amazon Watch. 
  
Moreover, leakages of hazardous chemicals have heavily distorted the indigenous areas 
of the Oriente. Every two weeks an estimated amount of 17,000 – 21,000 gallons of oil 
were dumped in the Oriente trough spills from flow lines alone (excluding transnational 
and secondary pipelines) and left unclean.135 Besides, toxic and waste water were 
dumped directly into streams and the jungle to maximize profits through technology costs 
minimization. It has been reported that the technology to re-inject waste in to the ground 
would have cost Texaco about $3.00 per barrel, and Texaco has saved an estimated 
amount of five billion dollars in the total twenty years of its stay in oriente and generated 
40 billion dollars revenue annually.136 On the other hand, toxic dumping has reported to 
affect one million hectares of rainforest and about 30,000 indigenous population of the 
Oriente.137
                                                 
134 Kimmerling, 1990-1991: 865-66 
135 See Kimmerling, 1990-1991: 865-66 
136 Fielding. 2001: 133 
137 See Chelala & Garro. 14 Jun. 2007. On-line available at: www.commondreams.org visited 15 Apr. 2008  












Fig.3.2. Waste pit filled with crude oil left in the forest Oriente: Equador. 
N.B. Photo by Lou Dematteis, courtesy of Amazon Watch 
  
In 1972 Texaco completed a road construction at the heart of Oriente which principally 
aimed for better access to the extraction areas.138 However, colonists, land speculators, 
loggers, ranchers, and agro-industry follow the roads into the forests and it has become 
the ‘primary engine of deforestation’.139 It has been estimated that 2.5 million acres of 
rain forest were opened up this way, and increased the vulnerability of the indigenous 
community of the Oriente for further dispossession. 140
  
The whole activity of the transnational petroleum companies including Texaco, from 
1964 until it left Ecuador in 1992; Petro-Ecuador; and the nine foreign companies 
involved in the project dispossessed indigenous peoples, forced them to change their 
traditional way of life such as hunting and fishing, degraded the forest resources on 
which the indigenous people depend for food, medicine, spiritual sacrifices, ancestral 
connections and disturbed the whole indigenous way of life. It also exposed them to 
respiratory and toxic infectious diseases.141  
 
This case illustrates the situation of direct complicity where the TNCs had directly 
involved in the abuse of indigenous peoples human rights protected by ILO-169 
                                                 
138 Fielding. 2001: 132 
139 Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 875 
140 Lyons. 2003-2004: 706 
141 See Kimmerling. 1990-1991: 868-870 
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concerning the rights to ancestral land and territory; ICCPR Art. 27 on rights to land, 
means of subsistence and cultural practices as cultural rights, and the common provision I 
of the twin covenants on rights to self-determination at least in the sense of a right to 
have a say in decisions that affect their existence. 
3.3.2. Mining in the Subanon’s Indigenous Territory, Philippines  
 
According to Mato – Secretary General of Siocon Subanon Association – the Subanon 
(meaning river-dwellers) are the largest indigenous groups in Philippines estimated to be 
more than 320,000 peoples in 2000.142 They live in Siocon – a town located in the 
southern part of Philippines in the province of Zamboanga del Notre, Mindanao – which 
 
                                                
 covers an area of 50,320 hectares 
with 80.34 % of forest land and 
includes Mt. Canatuan, a respected 
traditional prayer, worship and 
sacred burial ground of their 
ancestors. The Subanon are mainly 








Map2. The province of Zamboanga, where the  
Subanon are located & mining took place. 
(The red arrow and circle indicates) 
     
Unlike the situation in Ecuador, the Subanon and other indigenous peoples in Philippines 
have constitutional recognition since 1987. Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) has 
passed a decade later, and in the same year the government has granted to the Subanon a 
 
142 Mato statement made at WGIP 2001 meeting. On-line available at: www.tebtebba.org Visited 16 July 
2007 
143 Asuncion. 2005: 1-3 
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Certificate of Ancestral Domain Claim over 6,522,684 hectares in Siocon which later 
converted in to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title in 2003.144 These domestic legal 
instruments have provided indigenous peoples of the Subanon with basic rights to 
ancestral domain, self-governance, the right to cultural integrity, and the right to free 
prior and informed consent as a precondition for any exploration, development, 
exploitation, and utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains.145  
 
In the 1990s mining companies are attracted to indigenous ancestral domains including 
the sacred Mt. Canatuan. A prospector and financier named Ramon Bosque applied for a 
prospecting permit and later entered a Royalty Agreement with Benguet Corporation, 
Philippines’ oldest mining company, in 1990 and received approval for a Mineral 
Production Sharing Agreement in 1996.146 On the other hand, in 1993 TVI Resource 
Development Phils Inc. – a subsidiary of TVI International Marketing Limited (Hong 
kong) which is wholly owned subsidiary of TVI Pacific of Alberta Canada – entered 
mining operation in the same indigenous ancestral land of Siocon.147 In 1994, TVI 
Resource and Benguet executed an exploration agreement which is approved by the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in 1998 to operate in the name of TVI 
Resource.148  
 
TVI Resource started the mining operation without paying due regard to indigenous 
people rights protected under IPRA or the national constitution. As indicated in the 
picture below, the mining activities have desecrated the sacred burial grounds and the 
worship places on Mt. Canatuan.  
                                                 
144 Holden. 2005: 423 
145 Holden. 2005: 421-422 
146 Asuncion. 2005: 3-4 
147 Asuncion. 2005: 3 
148 Asuncion. 2005: 4-5 









Fig.3.5.  TVI mining site at the top of  Mt. Canatuan, a sacred site of the Subano: Philippines. 
N.B. Photo by a member of the Subanon community. 
 
The Subanon in Siocon considered Mt. Canatuan as traditional prayer and worship area 
and as the sacred burial ground of their ancestors and they have a story that: 
During Timuay Manglang’s leader ship,149 an epidemic struck the community. To 
spare the people, he offered the highest kind of ritual at Mt. Canatuan. It was 
believed that the prayer done in Mt. Canatuan was what saved the tribe.150
 
It is the interest of the Subanon, hence, to keep Mt. Canatuan to remain untouched so as 
not to disturb the spirit of their ancestors and prayers.  
 
TVI also displaced indigenous communities from their certified ancestral domain for the 
construction of mine plant, offices, barracks and warehouses; and continued bulldozing 
which forced many others to left their land. 151 Moreover, it has employed a paramilitary 
force called the Special Armed Auxiliaries who barred access of the indigenous 
community including food entry by blocking the roads; harassed community leaders; 
burned houses and fired rifles on indigenous leaders.152
  
In addition, the mining companies sought for judicial invalidation of IPRA. In 1998 a 
retired Supreme Court judge called Isagani Cruz and a lawyer called Ceasar presented a 
claim of invalidation of IPRA as an unconstitutional Act arguing that the Act is not in 
line with the 1987 constitution Section 2 of Art XII which gives the state the property 
                                                 
149 ‘Timuay’ is the Subanon term for ‘hereditary leader’. Asuncion. 2005: 4 
150 Asuncion. 2005: 4 
151 Asuncion. 2005: 5 
152 Asuncion. 2005: 5-6 
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rights to all natural resources.153 The Supreme Court entered a split decision in 2000 
when for the absence of majority consciences the IPRA ruled to remain a valid Act.154
  
The case of the national mining corporation (Benguet) and TVI Resource TNC goes 
beyond legislative gaps and government complicity problems. It shows the issue of lack 
of enforceability of indigenous peoples rights even in states where they got legal 
recognition. As is the case in Philippines, governments may use indigenous rights Acts 
for mere diplomatic and political purposes while soliciting the economic greed of some 
TNCs and political elites.  
 
It has been emphasized by Stavenhagen, in a seminar I participated, that closing the gap 
between law and practice is the current most appealing challenge of indigenous human 
rights movement in many countries where indigenous peoples human rights has got legal 
recognition, and this particularly holds true in Latin American countries.155 In fact, the 
whole situation points to the power of TNCs to influence states, and put a question of 
host states capability to protect the human rights of indigenous peoples and other 
vulnerable communities in their territories which will be dealt by the next chapter. 
3.3.3. The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline & Oil Project and the Bagyeli/pygmy people 
 
The Chad-Cameroon Pipeline & Oil Project (hereinafter CCPOP) is a striking example of 
complicity involving three powerful actors – the state, international financial institutions 
and TNCs – in human rights abuses of the Bagyeli indigenous community. The CCPOP 
is the largest ($ 4.2 billion) development project in Africa financed by an international 
consortium composed of Chevron (25%), PETRONAS (35%) and led by ExxonMobil, 
the US based world’s wealthiest Corporation, holding the biggest share of $3.7 billion 
(40%).156 The World Bank provided $39.5 million to finance minority holdings Tchad 
Oil Transportation Company (TOTCO) and $53.4 million to Cameroon Oil 
                                                 
153 Holden. 2005: 423 
154 While seven of the fourteen justices declared its unconstitutionality, the other seven declared it as 
constitutional and for the absence of majority consciences the Act ruled to remain valid. See Holden. 2005: 
424 
155  Stavenhagen. 26 Oct. 2007. Participatory Observation in a Seminar held in UN, New York. 
156 See Friends of the Earth International (FOE) Cameroon et al. On-line available at http://bankwatch.org  
Visited 29 May 2007 
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Transportation Company (COTCO).157 In addition, the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), one of the Banks’ private sector arms, provided loans of $100 million each to 
TOTCO and COTCO and mobilized an additional $100 million from other sources, 
known as B-loans.158  
  
As envisaged in the Map below, the basic project is a construction of a 650-mile (1,070 
Km.) long pipeline passes through Cameroon to the Atlantic coast where the oil is finally 
shipped to the US and Europe. However, it also included the development of 300 oil 
wells in Doba basin of southern Chad, building a marine pipeline at Kribi to a floating 





















Map 3.3.The Chad Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project (the broken line indicates) 
N.B. Map by Peter Black.160
 
The international consortium required World Bank’s support as a pre-condition to pursue 
the project because, first, to get political risk insurance in a volatile region, and second to 
attract additional co-financing from other sources such as the US Export-Import Bank 
and the European Investment Bank, the later approved $120 million.161 It has been 
commented that the project would not have been viable without the Banks 
                                                 
157 See Horta. 2006: 2 
158 Horta. 2006: 2 
159 See Horta et al. 2002: 3 
160 Taken from Horta et al. 2002: ii 
161 See Horta. 2002: 233  
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involvement,162 and hence deep analysis of the project impact should have been the 
banks’ priority. 
 
The indigenous peoples of Central Africa traditionally called the ‘pygmy’ refer 
themselves as ‘people of the forest’ estimated to be 500,000 in numbers when the project 
pursued in 2000.163 They live in the forest Congo basin ranging from Cameroon to 
Burundi. The people of forest constitutes indigenous peoples of the Ba’Aka, Babongo, 
Bacwa, Bagyeli, Baka, Bakola, Baluma, Bambenjelle, Bambuti, Bangombe, Basua, 
Batua, Batwa, Benet, Bofi, Bororo, Efe, Ik, Kirdi, Mbororo, Medzan, Mefa, Mikaya, and 
Pokot – same people named differently in different countries.164
 
The CCPOP affected the Bagyeli, also called the Bakola forest people who reside in the 
forest of Cameroon. The pipeline construction crosses Bagyeli land at least five times in 
the Bipindi and moved the Bagyeli to other camps.165 The clearing of forest in fifteen 













Fig. 3.4. Cleared forests 15 meters on each side of the pipeline. 
N.B. Picture by Courtesy of Forest People Programme.167
 
                                                 
162 See Horta et al. 2002: 5 
163 Jackson. 2004: 15 
164 Jackson. 2004: 14; see also ACHPR. 2005: 15-16  
165 Nelson et al. 2001: 12 
166 Nelson et al. 2001: 12-13 
167 Taken from Horta et al. 2002: ii 
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The opening up of the forest has also further human rights impacts in that of increasing 
the Bagyeli vulnerability to outsiders exposing them to new diseases, and more economic 
and socio-cultural discriminations. For instance, an increase in commercial bush-meat 
hunting by outsiders, such as loggers and poachers, moving into the area has 
documented.168  
 
It should be noted that the legal status of indigenous peoples in many African countries 
including Chad and Cameroon is different from their fellows in Latin America. Neither 
Chad nor Cameroon recognizes the very existence of indigenous peoples in their national 
territories.169 Moreover, both Chad and Cameroon are not signatories of the most 
important convention on indigenous land rights ILO-169. However, this fact would not 
lessen either TNCs or states liability for human rights nor does it undermines alleged 
human rights violations. First, ILO-169 entails human rights obligation even on non-
ratifying states due to its growing status as customary international law.170 Second, 
ratification is an issue to determine states’ obligation vis-à-vis the rights incorporated in 
the specific convention rather than concern of human rights violation by private actors. 
Thirdly, whether an international human rights instrument is ratified or not, it serves as a 
standard of measurement for human observance/non-observance, as the case may be.171 
Thus, non-ratification is not excuse for indigenous human rights abuse by any actor in a 
state. Besides, both countries are members of other human rights conventions significant 
for indigenous peoples such as ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD and ICRC,172 which entail 
states’ obligation to recognize, respect, protect and promote the human rights of all 
peoples in their territories including the Bagyeli. 
   
In general, this case primarily illustrates the complicity of the oil TNCs and the World 
Bank in the human rights abuse of the Bagyeli people of forest of Cameroon. The project 
could not escape from criticism in its very beginning due to the fact that both countries 
                                                 
168 Nelson et al. 2001:12
169 Horta. 2006:11 
170 See the detail in Anaya. 2004: 61-96 
171 See, for instance, the jurisprudence of IACHR which referred to ILO-169 in Awas Tingni case, while 
Nicaragua was not a party to it.  
172 While Cameroon has ratified ICCPR & ICESCR since Sep 1995, ICERD by Jul. 1971 and ICRC on 
Feb. 1993; Chad has ratified ICCPR & ICESCR since Sep 1984, ICERD by Sep. 1977 and ICRC on Nov. 
1990. See www.ohchr.org
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were governed by authoritarian regimes, have been ranked amongst the most corrupt 
countries in the world on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, and 
both documented by the State Department's Annual Report on Human Rights as the 
world's most poorly governed countries.173 Internal and external voices have also been 
heard to postponement of the project until a political willingness for poverty reduction 
and respect for human rights has shown in both countries.174  
  
Disregarding the plea the Bank decided to proceed with the project in 2000 and 
simultaneously built the capacity of both governments.175 According to Tófalo “financing 
a repressive regime, where a bank provided a government with a bad human right record, 
serves its abusive policies” and amounts to indirect complicity.176 The project 
construction has completed in 2003 one year a head of the expected time; but as predicted 
it has worsened the human rights conditions in both countries, affected many 
communities, and increased the vulnerability of the poor and indigenous peoples.177
 
Some compensation has been arranged for some affected communities from both the 
Bagyeli and Bantu. However, it has been criticized as inadequate, discriminatory and 
deceitful.178 Moreover, compensation has inherent shortcomings regarding some of the 
losses sustained by indigenous communities. For instance, in case of destruction of sacred 
sites, compensation assessment works only in relation to the values of the trees removed 
and the cleared land. To quote Jackson, for the pygmy, “the whole forest is sacred; the 
spirits of the ancestors and the forest are one and the same being. ‘The spirits of the 
ancestors are in the forests. Spirit and forest are one, inseparable, one always’.”179 
                                                 
173 Horta. 2002: 233 
174 For instance, the Chadian civil society organizations and Cameroon’s Center for Environment and 
Development; coalition of NGOs from developed countries; and the US Congress through a Bi-partisan 
Congressional letter addressed to the then World Bank President, James Wolfensohn had all requested for 
the project’s postponement. See Horta. 2006: 3-4  
175 Horta. 2006: 3 
176 Tófalo. 2005: 7 
177 Horta. 2006: 4 
178 It has been mentioned that the Bantu has been well informed about the project and the compensation 
plan while the Bagyeli are not; the Bantu has deceitfully claimed Bagyeli lands as their own and received 
compensation taking advantage of the better information they have received, their dominancy both in 
number and local politics, and prior knowledge of the Bagyeli way of life and traditional land system. See 
Nelson. 2001: 9-11; FOE Cameroon et al. pp.7. See also Horta. 2002: 234 for other compensation related 
problems. 
179 Jackson. 2004: 15 
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Compensation cannot measure such loss of spiritual values, and cultural attachments in 
material terms. This is of special concern for the Bagyeli given the irreversible loss of the 
forest and their land where the pipeline traverses.  
  
Second, the case proves the World Bank's failure to respect its own Guidelines on 
indigenous peoples. To the extent that the World Bank plays a vital role in financing this 
project, it should have been adhere to its policy on indigenous peoples.180  The Bank’s 
policy on Indigenous Peoples Operational Directive 4.20 (hereinafter OD 4.20), which 
was in effect at the time of loan preparation and until 2005, request, among other things, 
impact assessment to be made by the Bank where there is a legal gap concerning the 
recognition of local communities’ rights.181 The Bank had relied on Indigenous Peoples' 
Plan (IPP), which was meant to develop the indigenous community, but criticized of the 
following defects.  
 
First, IPP was built on the assumption that future commitments would be made by the 
government of Cameroon towards protection of the indigenous communities affected by 
the project.182 Yet any of such commitments had achieved until 2007.183 Second, IPP was 
not prepared in line with the Bank’s OD 4.20 which stresses the informed participation of 
local communities.184 A finding of participatory consultation made at grassroot levels 
revealed information gaps about the Bagyeli means of livelihood amongst COTCO 
officials, who are responsible for implementing the compensation process and for 
drawing up the IPP, and about the pipeline project amongst the Bagyeli.185 Third, the 
Cameroonian foundation established with a trust fund of $3 million from the oil 
consortium, to finance both implementation of the IPP and the management of two 
                                                 
180 A reader should note the fact that the World Bank is not a human rights organization. It is a financial 
institution with the main purpose of giving loan for development projects and making the assurance of its 
return unless in the case of concession agreements. However, recently the Bank has declared its concern for 
human rights of indigenous peoples with the adoption of OD 4.20.  
181 The directive provides policy guidance to (a) ensure that indigenous people benefit from development 
projects, and (b) avoid or mitigate potentially adverse effects on indigenous people caused by Bank-assisted 
activities. It also requires special action to be taken by the Bank where its investments affect indigenous 
peoples, tribes, ethnic minorities, or other groups whose social and economic status restricts their capacity 
to assert their interests and rights in land and other productive resources.  See Operational Directives 4.20 
on Indigenous Peoples. 1991. 
182 Horta. 2006: 11 
183 See AFRODAD. 2007: 19-21 
184 See OD 4.20. 1991. Parag. 6, 8 & 9 
185 See the detail in Nelson et al. 2001.
 - 47 -  
national parks (Campo Ma'an and Mbem-Djerem) had failed due to internal conflict, lack 
of strategic objectives and proper financial planning.186
  
Last but not least, the case illustrates the collusion of TNCs, host states and even 
international financial institutions in indigenous peoples human rights violations. Oil 
companies have almost always been denounced of complicity in human rights violations 
particularly in Africa. In CCPOP, however, the co-financing of the project by the World 
Bank has taken the attention from the corporations. The blame by both domestic and 
foreign human rights NGOs, governments concerned with the issue as well as indigenous 
group representatives were successfully led astray to the World Bank. In general the 
whole process of relocation and forest clearing as well as lack of participation in impact 
assessment plans and discrimination in compensation contravenes indigenous peoples 
human rights to land, their cultural rights and rights to self-determination and rights to 
non-discrimination protected under ILO-169, ICCPR, UNDRIP & ICERD. 
 
To conclude, the cases analyzed here do not intended to mean that all TNCs violate 
human rights and are always contempt for humanity. Even if it is debatable that whether 
such developments benefits brought by TNCs trickle down to indigenous peoples; the 
positive impacts of TNCs such as opening new jobs, increasing capital and technology 
along with their derivative benefits such as health facilities, education, and even political 
rights must be acknowledged. It does not also means that indigenous peoples are the only 
human right victims of TNCs. Other vulnerable groups, communities, and tribal groups 
are also susceptible to these abuses. Nonetheless, the cases discussed in this chapter 
evidenced the factual worse scenarios of indigenous peoples human rights abuses and 
violations by TNCs observed in the last few years in order to avoid a purely theoretical 
and elusive discussions. It is not my purpose to establish liability, but the cases provide a 
more conceptual understanding of the human rights situations that need to be addressed. 
 
Having identified what sorts of indigenous peoples human rights are affected by TNCs 
and indicating the situation of increased vulnerability of these people for further human 
rights abuses by others, the next chapter will examine if such acts of TNCs entail liability 
under the existing system of international law. 
                                                 
186 Horta. 2006:11 
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CHAPTER 4. REGULATORY CHALLENGE POSED BY TNCS 
 
This chapter is organized into four parts each addressing different but interrelated legal 
questions. The first part raises two basic issues dealing with the indirect approach of 
classical international law in regulating non-state actors including TNC. First, is the 
classical state-based international law capable of regulating TNCs? Second, do states 
have ‘vicarious’ or ‘indirect’ liability for human rights violations by TNCs? On the basis 
of these issues it deals with if host states can effectively regulate TNCs and impose 
liability in case of breach. It also analyses whether extraterritorial legislations from home 
states, ATCA taken as an example, can serve as effective instruments to impose human 
rights liability on TNCs for their complicity in human rights abuses abroad.  
 
The second part deals with whether TNCs have direct human rights liability under the 
current international law. Then it tackles the theory of ‘corporate veil’ which further 
impede the direct liability approach, and analyzes proposed solutions.  
 
In its third part, the chapter considers if there is alternative basis of TNCs liability. To 
this end it analyses the effectiveness of ‘unjust enrichment’ claims for indigenous human 
rights victims who claim monetary compensation from TNCs. Then the fourth part goes 
on discussing if private law, i.e., bilateral and multilateral agreements can be a solution, 
and end up by drawing conclusion. 
4.1. The Human Rights Liability of TNCs: the Indirect Approach  
 
Conventionally international law imposes human rights responsibility directly on states to 
regulate private actors including TNCs not to infringe the human rights of their people.187 
TNCs human rights behaviors, thus, regulated indirectly through their home or host 
states. Host state refers to those states where TNCs operate their businesses when it is 
different from their country of citizenship or incorporation. Despite the debate that TNCs 
are global citizens and can not be subject to certain country citizenship, the term ‘home 
state’ is used to refer broadly to TNCs’ country of citizenship or incorporation. 
     
                                                 
187 We can find this reflection in many convents such as ICCPR,IESCR, ICERD, ICRC etc. 
 - 49 -  
4.1.1. Host States-based Liability 
 
The theory of states liability for internationally wrongful acts is incorporated under the 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which later 
adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) and annexed to the General 
Assembly Resolution in 2001 [hereinafter ILC Articles on Responsibility of State].188 
Legally speaking, the ILC Articles on Responsibility of State are not binding principles. 
However, since they are the reflections of “highly recognized publicists in international 
law” and “evidences of established and developing customary international law”; they 
have high authoritative force.189  
  
An act is qualified as an internationally wrongful act up on the fulfillment of two 
cumulative elements. First, the act should be attributable to the state through action or 
omission or both; and second, the act must constitute a breach of a valid international 
obligation of a state which is in force for that state at that specific time.190 States being 
artificial creations of the law can act only “by and through their agents and 
representatives.”191  International law, thus, attributes the acts of state representatives – 
government organs which naturally presumed as state representatives to exercise power – 
and agents – any person who has acted under the ‘direction’, ‘instigation or control of 
those organs’ – as acts of the state.192
  
Theoretically the act of individuals, corporations or collectivities linked to the state by 
nationality, permanent residence or incorporation may attribute to the state regardless of 
any connection with the government.193 However, this view is disregarded under 
international law so as to limit the liability of states only to acts that engage the state as 
an institution and also to recognize the autonomy of persons (both legal and natural 
persons) acting in their own account.194 Hence, the general principle remains that “the 
only conduct attributed to the state at the international level is that of its organs of 
                                                 
188 See Clapham. 2006: 241  
189 Chirwa. 2004: 5 
190 ILC Articles on Responsibility of states. 2001. Art 2; see the detail in ILC Commentaries to the Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of State for Internationally Wrongful Acts. 2001: 68-74 [hereafter ILC 
Commentary] 
191 See ILC Commentary. 2001: 71  
192 See ILC Commentary. 2001. Art.4, 5, 8 in pp.84-86 
193 ILC Commentary. 2001: 80 
194 ILC Commentary. 2001: 80 
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government, or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or control of 
those organs, i.e., as agents of the State.”195
 
The flip side of this argument is that the act of private actors including TNCs is not prima 
facie attributable to a state to entail international liability unless the state empowers the 
corporation to exercise public authority or the wrongful act is performed under the 
‘instruction of’, or ‘direction or control of’’ that state.196 This holds true “even where 
such corporation is wholly owned by the state or the state has a controlling interest in 
it.”197 In this case a TNC may become public authority rather than private entity and 
hence its acts considered as acts of the state. Otherwise, neither the TNCs nor the national 
affiliates are part of organs of the government to be attributed to neither the host nor the 
home state and to entail liability there to. Hence, the human rights abusive acts of TNCs 
are not attributable to either home or host states under international law except for the 
above, less probable, conditions of acting as states representatives. Whether a wrongful 
act which is not directly attributable to a state can still implicates states’ ‘vicarious’ or 
‘indirect’ liability under international law is the other issue. 
  
Under international human rights law states have the obligation to respect, protect, and 
fulfill human rights of every individual within their territory and subject to their 
jurisdiction against any violation by private organs including TNCs. 198 In fact most states 
have explicitly undertaken these human rights obligations through ratification of different 
international human rights conventions. States are obliged not only to refrain from 
infringement of human rights but also to ensure that others, including business entities 
such as TNCs, do not infringe such rights. According to Chirwa, the state obligation to 
protect human rights entails three main obligations: “to prevent violations of human 
rights in the private sphere; to regulate and control private actors; and to investigate 
violations, punish perpetrators and provide effective remedies to victims.”199  
 
The treaty bodies in most cases also require states to establish monitoring, regulatory and 
adjudication mechanism. Accordingly, those host states that have ratified the 
                                                 
195 ILC Commentary. 2001: 80 
196 ILC Commentary. 2001: 110-112; see also the detail in McCorquoldale & Simons. 2007: 606-608 
197 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States. 2000. Art. 8 
198 See the detail in Ruggie. 2007a. Parag. 39-71
199 Chirwa. 2004: 4 
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international conventions which safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples such ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CERD, CRC and ILO-169 have a treaty based legally binding international 
obligations to respect the human rights of indigenous peoples enshrined in these 
conventions and to ensure the observance of such rights by other non-state actors 
including TNCs.  
 
There is also non-treaty based obligation on host states when the breached law is a 
peremptory norm or jus cojens or a general principle applicable in the international legal 
order. In discharging such obligations host states have a legitimate right to establish 
regulatory regimes that can hold TNCs fully and directly liable for any infringement of 
human rights, “including legislations, adjudication through judicial remedies and 
compensation where appropriate.”200 These human rights obligations of host states, thus, 
are relevant not only in imposing indirect liability on TNCs who allegedly violate human 
rights through the mechanism of host state regulatory mechanisms but also in implicating 
host states’ indirect liability for such acts.  
 
Host states failure to take necessary measures to avoid the infringement or to effectively 
redress the victims entails liability on the host states themselves. As commented by the 
IACHR in Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras case that “a human rights violation which is 
initially not directly imputable to a state can lead to international responsibility of the 
state ‘not because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the 
violation or to respond to it’.”201 Hence, TNCs implication in human rights violations 
will not per se entail direct liability of host states under international law, but states can 
be held liable for failure to exercise ‘due diligence’ to protect the human rights of their 
people from being infringed by non-state actors including TNCs. 
 
Taking into account the current global power of TNCs, the pressure of globalization and 
international financial institutions on market deregulation, the debit crisis and most states 
implications in alleged human rights violations by TNCs; whether host states, most of 
which are developing countries, are willing and/or capable of imposing direct obligation 
on TNCs to respect the human rights of indigenous peoples living in their territory is an 
                                                 
200 Rugie. 2007a: 15 
201 Chiwa. 2004: 14; see also in detail the concept of ‘due diligence’ in pp. 14-18 
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appealing issue. In short, whether host states’ domestic legal systems are capable of 
regulating TNCs is the issue. There are four basic obstacles in this regard.  
 
First, the dilemma of prioritizing respect for human rights in general or indigenous 
human rights in particular from the debt crisis they are in. Host states, most of which 
happen to be developing countries, often refrain from imposing human rights standards 
on TNCs being afraid of losing the investment market to their competing 
neighborhoods.202 Second, most governments of both host and home states have less 
political will to recognize the very existence of ‘indigenous peoples’; and even those 
states which recognize indigenous peoples do not want to go far in recognizing land and 
resource rights.203 Third, even if there is a political will, the unequal economic power 
with TNCs and the lack of adequate judicial mechanisms make the host states regulatory 
mechanism less effective. Fourth, the traditional mechanisms of ensuring human rights 
through domestic legal framework could not work with TNCs as they are global actors 
operating across borders and hence not effectively subject to domestic jurisdiction of host 
states. These and other factors limited the effectiveness of host states-based human rights 
liability of TNCs. 
4.1.2. Home States-based Liability 
 
Whether home states have the obligation to ensure the activity of TNCs headquartered on 
their territory, subsidiaries or sub-contractors to comply with international human rights 
standards in their overseas operation is the questions here. As a matter of principle, under 
international law states have the obligation to ensure the activity of their people or legal 
entities not to infringe the human rights of others.204 However, whether the duty to 
protect extends beyond jurisdiction or extra-territorially remains an open debate that 
requires detail analysis.205  
 
                                                 
202 See the detail analysis on the human rights impact of competing for FDI in Chu Yun Juliana Nam. 2005. 
203 For instance, the 2004-2006 UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies review reveals violations of indigenous 
peoples’ rights to own and control their traditional lands and resources in all except one of the states 
reviewed. Forest People Programme & Tebtebba Foundation. 2006. 
204 It is the extension of the obligation to protect human rights against violations committed by its agents, 
private persons or entities. See the General Comment 31 by the Human Rights Committee discussed in. 
Ruggie. 2007a: 14 
205 See, for instance, Ruggie. 2007a. Parag. 81-92 
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According to the Committee on ECSCR, states have to take action to prevent their 
citizens’ and companies’ human rights violations even abroad in observance of the 
principle of ‘non-intervention to the internal affairs of a state’.206 The Committee on 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women also encouraged and even required state 
parties to take appropriate action to hold accountable their corporations accused of human 
rights violations abroad.207 There are also some jurisprudences developed in the last few 
years based on the requirement of exerting effective control. Accordingly, home states 
can assume jurisdiction on non-state actors at overseas operation so long as they exercise 
‘effective control’ and hence their obligation can be extended extraterritorially in this 
regard.208 Thus, up on the limitation of ‘non-intervention’ in sovereignty of states and 
with the fulfillment of ‘effective control’ home states have the obligation to regulate their 
TNCs operating across their borders.  
 
Despite such forceful arguments, however, there is no specific international law which 
obliges states to assure human rights observance by their private actors in their overseas 
operation. The New York and Brussels Workshops (2006) also affirmed that “neither the 
treaty regime nor customary international law currently impose an obligation on states to 
regulate [TNCs], as opposed to allowing states  the freedom to do so.”209  Hence, the 
current human rights environment is permissive regarding home states’ obligation to 
regulate the human rights behavior of their TNCs operating beyond their jurisdictions. 
 
Very recently in 2007 legal scholars have developed an argument that TNCs complicity 
in human rights violations abroad can implicate home states liability under international 
law. This unique approach taken by McCorquodale & Simons210 is that even if home 
states do not intend to encourage their TNCs operating abroad to commit human rights 
norms, home states somehow have contributed to the creation of human rights conducive 
environments through engagement in foreign relations that assist TNCs to ‘win contracts 
                                                 
206 See Ruggie. 2007a: 15 
207 See Ruggie. 2007a: 15 
208 See the jurisprudence of IACHR, ECHR & HRC discussed in McCorquoldale & Simons. 2007: 602-05 
209 Ruggie. 2006b: 11  
210 Robert McCorquodale is Professor of International Law and Human Rights at the School of Law, 
University of Nottingham, UK and Penelope Simons is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, 
University of Ottawa, Canada. 
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in foreign markets and lobby against regulatory and political barriers’.211 Even if no 
jurisprudence so far has developed in this regard to elaborate further, homes states’ 
involvement in negotiating human right terms with host states through bilateral 
agreements and its impact on human rights has documented.212
 
Despite the lack of clarity regarding home states liability either to regulate their TNCs 
operating abroad or their own liability based on the recent indirect implication theory 
through foreign affairs; some home states have made initiatives towards imposing human 
rights liability in their TNCs. Hence, while extraterritorial legislations of home states 
remain a more viable alternative in many situations, its effectiveness is an analyzed as 
follows taking ATCA as an example.  
4.1.3. Extraterritorial Legislations: Experience from the US ATCA  
 
In the last few decades, extraterritorial legislations appeared mainly from the developed 
countries of the common law system. The oldest Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) of US 
(1789), which expanded its jurisdiction to TNCs recently;213 the US Corporate Conduct 
Bill (2000) which is not yet a law; the Australian Corporate Code of Conduct Bill (2000) 
which is discarded by the parliamentary committee as “impracticable, unworkable, 
unnecessary and unwanted”;214 and the Belgian Code on Corporate Governance (2004) 
from the civil law system are the remarkable once.215  
  
All these legislations may give the forum for plaintiffs from the developing world to 
bring their claims in more developed legal systems where the defendant TNCs are based 
and where their assets are available for satisfaction of eventual judgments.216 
Nonetheless, the US ATCA would be of particular interest here as it is a unique Act with 
rich jurisprudence, and allows any alien, including indigenous peoples, to bring a tort 
claim against TNCs through pleading a violation of the ‘law of nations’ or ‘treaty of US’. 
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Originally, ATCA grants district courts of US to assume original jurisdiction over any 
civil action based on tort (extra-contractual liability) brought by an alien in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of US.217 ATCA, however, was not referred adequately 
before the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980) which came up with its modern 
interpretation that claims of customary international law violations by state officers can 
be adjudicated.218 Deviating from the traditional assumption that only states are capable 
of violating human rights, the case of Filartiga brought a new scenario that private actors, 
i.e., individuals can violate customary international law and can be adjudicated under 
ATCA for such violations.  
 
The jurisdiction of ATCA has further expanded to adjudicate non-state actors violations 
of jus cogens norms which by definition could not be derogated by states or private actors 
in the case of Kadic v. Kardadzic.219 Later on, in the case of Doe v. Unocal the 
jurisdiction of ATCA extended to cases of TNCs up on the fulfillment of state 
compliance.220 Since then many TNCs have experienced human rights litigations under 
ATCA.221
 
Under ATCA with out a need to be US citizen/ resident plaintiffs from all over the world 
can initiate a suit against TNCs regardless of the later’s country of incorporation or 
citizenship. Nevertheless, for the US district courts to assume ratione personae or 
personal jurisdiction on foreign TNCs, the parent corporations should be located in US or 
there should exist ‘sufficient’ business presence in the US.222 As explained by De Feyter, 
“the court verifies whether international law exists; whether the US recognizes the 
applicable law or whether the alleged violation is breach of customary international law 
[the law of nations] regardless of US Treaty membership; whether the law is still valid 
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and whether the defendant violated the law.”223 However, in its current application TNCs 
can be sued under ATCA up on the fulfillment of one of the following two conditions. 
First, the alleged violations should be a violation of jus cogens norms and/or second, 
there should be proof of state complicity.224
  
The state complicity requirement would not pose big challenge since in almost all major 
cases of reported human rights abuses by TNCs the host states were prominently and 
actively involved and often engaged in contractual agreements of various kinds such as 
concessions, joint ventures, and production-sharing agreements.225 The challenge rather 
lies on proving a violation of the ‘law of nation’ which is understood as customary 
international law or a jus cogens norm recognized by the US legal system. Piracy, war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and slavery are the only jus cogens norms 
recognized by Federal Courts of US.226  
 
However, the US Supreme Court has commented that “… the present-day law of nations 
rest on a norm of international law character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”227 Hence, the US courts adhere to progressive interpretation approach in 
appreciation of such norms. For instance, in the case of Unocal forced labor was equated 
to modern day slavery, and, thus, considered as the violation of a jus cogens norm.228 
This evolutionary approach is significant as human rights are often written in general 
terms, leaving ample scope for the judges to creatively apply the provisions taking in to 
account up-to-date situations. 
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Scholars argued that ‘Cultural Genocide’ should be considered as an international crime 
against humanity and some court cases have also appeared under ATCA.229  Regardless 
of the debate that whether cultural genocide can be categorized under the jus cogens 
norm ‘genocide’ and constitutes an international crime against humanity; the concept 
could be of relevant for indigenous claimants, who faces the danger of cultural extinction 
due to TNCs operation in their land, to bring a suit under ATCA.  
 
Furthermore, Salazar has argued on the possibility of bringing a suit under ICCPR and 
ICESR which can be considered as part of customary international law taking into 
consideration their long years of entry into force and the high number of ratified states.230 
In fact, this view has basis in the General Comment of the UN Human Rights Committee 
that many of the rights contained in the twin covenants including Art. 27 which deals 
with cultural rights of minorities has the character of jus cogens norms.231 Yet no 
jurisprudence has developed so far. 
  
ATCA is also considered as a very significant legislation to initiate a case against TNCs 
due to some procedural advantages that the US legal system provides for plaintiffs. First, 
unsuccessful litigants are not required to pay opponents’ cost unless it is found as 
absolutely ‘vexatious’ litigation – brought merely to harass the other party.232 This is 
particularly important in human rights cases brought against TNCs for the arguments 
raised are ‘novel and therefore especially risky’ and costly.233 Moreover, the risk of 
covering contingency fee if they lose the case would have frustrated indigenous 
plaintiffs’ from initiating the suit. Second, the lawyers’ in US often agree on contingency 
basis which lowers the plaintiff’s legal cost in case of loss.234 There are also public 
interest legal sectors that take cases at minimal costs, and rewards for successful law 
firms which encourage firms to take such kind of difficult and novel cases.235 Third, in 
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US damage awards are higher than other countries and indigenous peoples who win the 
case could be well compensated, at least in monitory terms.236 Last but not least, under 
ATCA the US district courts will assume jurisdiction based on the plaintiffs’ successful 
plea of a violation of international law as opposed to any domestic laws.237 Even if Such 
claim of ‘universal jurisdiction’, which depicts the idea that “states may (or perhaps in 
most cases must) exercise their own lawmaking capacity to make the relevant offence 
punishable under domestic law no matter where in the world it takes place, or who 
commits it” is still disputed,238 the US courts assumption of jurisdiction on the basis of 
violation of international law will ease the issue of extraterritorial application of laws. 
  
Nevertheless, ATCA has both procedural and substantive limitations partly because it has 
never originally intended to regulate the newly emerged transnational global actors nor to 
safeguard indigenous peoples human rights. Particularly, due to strong procedural 
obstacles, at least until 2006, no case has been decided on the merits with an award of 
compensation to the victims while twenty have been dismissed for procedural obstacles 
and only three settled.239  
 
As noted by scholars, the notion of ‘forum non conveniens’ is one of the procedural 
impediments under ATCA that serves TNCs to escape human rights liability in general, 
and for parent companies to shed themselves from being held liable for the oversea 
activities of their subsidiaries.240 The common law doctrine ‘forum non conveniens’ gives 
the US district courts the discretionary authority to refuse a hearing of a case brought 
under ATCA if it serves justice and the ‘best’ interest of the defendant, and the court can 
order the case to be heard in an alternative forum where the alleged violations 
committed.241 Thus, once a defendant raised such a defense and pointed out other 
appropriate forum, the burden shifts on the plaintiff to convince the court that justice 
cannot be served in that convenient forum. 
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In general, both the home and host states based liability have critical limitations proving 
their inefficiency and ineffectiveness to ensure TNCs liability for indigenous people 
human rights violations. Even if some home states based legal forums are available, due 
to their serious limitations they are far from being effective. If we take ATCA, for 
instance, despite the procedural limitations there are also logistic impediments such as the 
cost of traveling abroad for indigenous plaintiffs and their witnesses, staying abroad or 
going back to attend hearings, finding advocates, and so on. Moreover, extraterritorial 
jurisdiction is not an equal choice available to all states as most states in the developing 
world have no capacity to exercise judicial power extraterritorially.  
 
On the other hand, the very idea of extraterritorial legislation is very controversial in that 
of contravening the sovereignty – non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. The 
issue debated here is whether exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction with the goal of 
protecting human rights could also amount to intervention. As argued by De Feyter “… 
extraterritorial application of home state legislation should not be problematic to the 
extent that home state law reflects international law. […] For want of an international 
forum, US or other domestic courts could in such cases act as ‘agents’ of international 
law.”242 Still a problem remains regarding adjudication of cases involving TNCs as 
international law is applicable on states and not on TNCs.243 Hence, extraterritorial 
legislation regarding TNCs is not as such a reflection of international law and justified 
only through indirect extension of home state’s obligation to provide domestic remedies 
for victims of their corporations operating abroad.244  
 
Taking into consideration the high resource capacity and ‘better’ judicial systems, home 
states adjudications of TNCs by applying host state laws in home state courts is proposed 
as another possible approach. While this approach eases the issue of extraterritoriality, it 
is criticized as ‘judicial imperialism’.245 It is also suspicious of resulting in imposition of 
‘protectionist laws’ under the disguise of human rights enforcements.246 There are also 
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some frustrations that it may result in “unrealistic expectations on states to keep abreast 
of every overseas abuse by a related TNC”, and/or TNCs may delegate most of their 
activities to local companies to evade parents’ liability at home.247 After all, as pointed 
out by Ruggie home state are not kin to control their TNCs operating abroad particularly 
if that can put them in disadvantage positions, too costly, time-consuming, or politically 
hazardous;248 and may “give higher priority to the creation of an investment-friendly 
environment than to promotion of human rights.”249
 
These and other shortcomings make either host or home states-based liability less 
effective and left the issue of TNCs human rights liability open for alternative 
mechanisms. 
4.2. The Human Rights Liability of TNCs: the Direct Approach  
 
As we have seen so far, the classical theory of international law which regulates TNCs 
human rights liability indirectly through home or host states’ legal system is neither 
effective nor efficient to regulate TNCs’ human rights misconduct. The alternative 
approach, thus, focuses on the TNCs themselves, i.e., whether TNCs have human rights 
liability under the existing system of international law, and if so to what extent.  
 
Under the classical concept of international law states are primary bearers of human 
rights responsibility, and there is no direct corporate liability for human rights.250 It is 
justified among others due to: 
a lack of state practice supporting such a development; likely resistance by states 
(especially states from the global south that are actively seeking foreign investment); 
the difficulty of TNCs in relying on the defenses available to states confronted with 
new obligations (such as state sovereignty, the ability to opt out, lodge reservations, 
etc.); and problems with attributing international legal personality to corporations.251
 
There are, however, different arguments developed on the basis of UDHR, ICCPR & 
ICESR that TNCs have direct human rights liability under international law. The UDHR 
requires “every individual and every organ of society” to “strive”, “to promote respect” 
for human rights and freedoms and “to secure their universal and effective recognition 
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and observance.”252 ICCPR and ICSCR have also nearly similar phrases which prohibit 
“any state, group or person” to engage in any activity that contravene the international 
human rights incorporated therein.253 It is widely argued that the reference by UDHR to 
‘organs of society’s to respect and promote human rights is a direct imposition of human 
rights obligation on TNCs as part of ‘organs of society’.254 Moreover, the reference of the 
twin covenants to ‘persons’ is open to interpretation that it can include in legal terms both 
physical and legal persons, and, thus, apply to TNCs as artificial creatures of the law.  
  
However, even if UDHR and the twin covenants seemingly establish direct human rights 
liability on corporations; states were designed as the only duty bearers who could violate 
international human rights law and corporations are liable for human rights only 
indirectly through the state regulatory mechanisms. Hence, with the absence of direct 
reference to corporations’ liability for human rights under UDHR or ICCPR & ICESCR, 
imposing direct human rights liability on TNCs on the basis of these human rights bills 
remains uncertain. Besides even if UDHR is a strong legal instrument as most of its 
provisions have the status of customary international law, whether the obligation on 
‘organs of society’ appears in its preamble has such a customary law status is 
debatable.255  
 
To sum up, despite the above and other related forceful arguments, there is no clear and 
precise international law that imposes direct liability on TNCs for human rights concerns. 
Besides, as Ruggie argues the recent effort to establish direct TNCs human rights liability 
on the basis of existing human rights instruments and simply assert that many of their 
provisions are binding on corporations has no authoritative base in ‘international law – 
hard, soft, or otherwise’.256 TNCs, however, are not only free from direct human rights 
liability; they also benefit from the theory of ‘corporate veil’ which limited their liability. 
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4.2.1. The Notion of Corporate Veil  
 
A discussion on theory of direct corporate responsibility to human rights will not be full 
if it fails to address the complementary doctrines of ‘corporate legal personality’ and 
‘limited liability’ which are known as ‘Corporate Veil’. Corporate legal personality is an 
old legal concept which traces back to Roman law. Based on the legal personality theory, 
corporations have an artificial personality created by the law which, in one hand, makes 
them different from its incorporators, shareholders (both individuals and corporations), 
managers, or directors; while on the other hand, empowers them to exercise certain 
juridical rights such as the right to sue and be sued, to enter contract, and to acquire and 
dispose property.257 Hence, TNCs have fictious personality created by the law which 
enables them to exercise some legal rights and to assume some obligations with different 
status from the physical persons acting behind them. 
  
Later on, the ‘corporate limited liability’ theory emerged and widespread in US and 
England in the early and end of the 19th century, respectively.258 Until the late 19th 
century, however, being suspicious and afraid of corporation’s monopoly on power; 
corporations were prohibited by law to own stock in other corporations.259 Even if TNCs 
start to flourish beginning from mid 19th century, the growth of the modern form of TNCs 
has observed by the end of WWII which is followed by the creation of the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now 
called the World Trade Organization) implemented by the allied powers to liberalize 
trade across borders so as to ease the economic devastation they have faced. 260 Later by 
the end of the Cold War globalization has expanded and increased trade between TNCs 
and states. 261 In the last years of the same century corporations based in England, 
Germany and other European countries began to expand their direct investment across the 
border.262  
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Without due consideration to these emerging new form of corporations, i.e., corporations 
with share holders in other corporations or corporations owning other corporations and 
corporation operating across border, the modern form of TNCs ‘immediately’ become 
beneficiaries of the existing limited liability theory.263 It is this unprecedented historical 
extension that remains a principle to date. Hence, as a matter of principle corporations, 
including TNCs, have limited liability that the shareholders’, even if they are other 
corporations who hold the share, cannot be hold legally responsible for any liabilities of 
the corporation beyond their share values.  
 
The corporate veil, thus, gives TNCs multiple layers of limited liability which also 
enables allocation of legal responsibility through varies subsidiaries and corporate forms 
to minimize parent TNCs’ exposure to direct liabilities.264 Since the legal effect of the 
veil is to give protection to the persons (natural or artificial) acting behind the corporation 
not to hold liable beyond their respective share values, in any satisfaction of judgment 
entered against TNCs, the judgment creditors265 (including indigenous peoples) cannot 
look for the assets of the share holders (be individuals or other corporations), managers or 
directors.266 The limited liability theory, thus, gives parent TNCs further advantage to 
hide from liability when the alleged violation is committed by their subsidiaries or other 
consultancies even if they act in their ‘sphere of influence’.267  
4.2.2. Piercing the Corporate Veil and Other Solutions 
 
In general terms, three basic solutions are proposed to defeat these legal impediments and 
to hold parent TNCs liable in lieu of the acts of their subsidiaries, or in general, other 
contractors operating abroad but under the sphere of influence of parent TNCs: 
  
I. Piercing the Corporate Veil: it is a legal principle developed in common law systems 
where courts can ‘pierce’ or ‘shift’ the corporate veil and impose liability on the share 
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holders when “... shareholder/s exercise extreme control over the relevant company, and 
the consideration of justice and policy mandate that the shareholder/s should bear the 
burden of a wrong perpetrated by the company, rather than the person/s who have 
suffered from that wrong.”268
 
However, when is a parent company said to have control over the subsidiary or what kind 
of control suffices to entail liability – administrative (over the board of directors), 
financial (by ownership of shares), and structural (through management of operations and 
affairs) – and what level of control – whether control should be to the extent of 
considering the subsidiary as mere agent of a parent company – are difficult issues to 
handle in empirical cases.269  
  
A findings of a survey conducted on around 4000 piercing cases also indicated that courts 
are less likely to pierce the veil on corporate groups than on individual shareholders due 
to inter alia the requirement of a strong evidence of misuse of corporate form, and within 
the category of corporate groups the veil lift often in tort cases than in contracts.270 For 
our purpose, while less probability of shifting the veil in corporate groups is a 
disadvantage as it avoids parent TNCs liability for alleged violations by subsidiaries; the 
high chance of shifting in tort cases, where most indigenous human rights claims against 
TNCs will fall, is a positive finding. The problem, however, is on defining how strong the 
misuse should be to shift the veil. Since ‘a strong misuse’ standard is too vague and 
subjects to the judiciary personal appreciation and understanding, it may weaken the 
development of consistent jurisprudence in this regard.  
  
II. The ‘Integrated Enterprise Approach’: this approach presumes that the acts of a 
subsidiary are directly attributable to the parent due to the interconnectedness of what 
otherwise be separate legal entities; and hence parent TNCs should always held liable 
even if the alleged violation is actually committed by their subsidiaries..271 It has been 
argued that the UN Norms under Art. 20 enforce such a normative approach in that: 
“since the definition of TNCs does not recognize the distinct legal personalities of the 
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corporations that together constitute the TNC, the Norms essentially pierce the corporate 
veil for all litigation involving an allegation of breach of its provisions.”272
  
This approach may ease the obstacles to recovery against a parent corporation by litigants 
pursuing action against the operations of an affiliate, subsidiary, related corporation, or 
other entity.273 However, it will destruct the whole theory of corporate legal personality 
and limited liability and would create business insecurities among share holders, directors 
and managers. This insecurity would intern defeat the purpose of the corporate veil which 
is intended to encourage investment through limiting risk. 
 
III. Imposing Direct Liability on the Parent Company: this theory advocates for the 
imposition of direct liability on the parent company based on the notion of ‘due 
diligence’. The idea is that a parent company’s failure to exercise due diligence, i.e., 
failure to act (in case of direct/indirect involvement in subsidiaries act) and omission 
(through failure to control the act of the subsidiary) should be understood as taking 
responsibility.274 This theory can be viable alternative as it limits parent TNCs liability 
on the basis of exercising ‘due diligence’. In doing so, it makes the theory of limited 
liability as a conditional right to be enjoyed by TNCs and can be invoked in situations of 
parent TNCs failure to exercise ‘due diligence’. However, the concept of ‘due diligence’ 
is too vague and need practical clarity. 
  
The purpose of the whole discussion on theories of legal personality and limited liability 
is not to challenge their very applicability to TNCs which would be detrimental to the 
interest of individuals who own the corporation and would end up by creating business 
insecurity. Rather it is to underline a couple of points. First the deviation of TNCs from 
the ancient corporate forms on which these doctrines were intended to apply in that of 
having corporate shareholders and their cross boarder operations should be noted. 
Keeping this consideration in mind would help courts in deciding whether or not to pierce 
a corporate veil and to go against parent TNCs for alleged human rights violation by their 
subsidiaries or those acting in their spheres of influence.  
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Second the aim is to emphasize the subsequent impact of the corporate veil in collecting 
judgments. In relation to resource availability factor for indigenous judgment creditors, 
both theories of legal personality and limited liability have almost similar consequences 
of limiting the liability to the assets of the subsidiary or the affiliated organs which 
actually perpetrated the alleged violations. As often is the case, parent TNCs are very rich 
and indigenous judgment creditors who succeed the case would not face resource 
problem during the execution process. Nonetheless, due to the benefits of limited liability 
indigenous claimants may face a shortage of resources registered in the name of a 
subsidiary or implicated affiliates of the TNC to execute judgments entered in their favor. 
This particularly may hold true when the judgment entered consists of huge amount of 
monetary compensations as usually the case in such kind of claims. Hence, despite the 
lack of direct human rights liability on TNCs the theory of corporate veil has put further 
legal impediments on TNCs liability. 
4.3. Unjust Enrichment as an Independent Basis of Liability 
 
Unjust enrichment is a legal theory of recovery developed to fill gaps left by conventional 
civil law categories of contract, tort or property; and suggested by Fagan to serve as ‘a 
strong legal base’ for particular claims of indigenous peoples human rights violations by 
TNCs.275 Indigenous plaintiffs who want to bring an unjust enrichment claim should 
fulfill the standards that: first, the defendant must accrue enrichment; second, the 
enrichment must occur at the expense of the plaintiff; and third, the enrichment must be 
contrary to justice or must be unjust.276 Besides, in an unjust enrichment claims since the 
burden of prove is on the plaintiff(s), “the claim must survive any countervailing defenses 
or considerations” to be invoked by the defendant(s).277  
  
Two substantive defenses are available for defendants in an unjust enrichment claim, 
namely, to deny the existence of enrichment or to argue against any injustice in the 
enrichment.278 It is up to the indigenous plaintiffs, thus, to tackle such formidable defense 
by establishing the nexus between defendant TNC’s enrichments at the expense of their 
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rights and its unjust nature. Proving the fact that a TNC has accrued benefits at the 
expense of indigenous peoples human rights is very tricky task. In some instances, such 
as the case of Texaco which claimed to accrue about 3$ per barrel by dumping off toxic 
in the oriente indigenous land and water of Ecuador rather than using the technology to 
re-inject it into the ground,279 it could be easy to establish enrichments accrued from 
injustice. However, in many cases it is difficult and sometimes impossible to establish the 
direct link between accrued profit of TNCs and indigenous human rights violations.  
 
Moreover, it leaves the open debate about which court has authority to exercise 
jurisdiction or literally where to file such claims; and which state law should get 
applicability. TNCs being international actors challenge the traditional law enforcement 
mechanisms of adjudicating cases at domestic courts by applying domestic laws. Whether 
the home state law/court where the TNCs incorporated or the host state law/court where 
the plaintiffs reside should get preference is not clear; and acting in both ways could raise 
the issue of extraterritorial application of laws 
 
The unjust enrichment approach, however, may serve as an alternative legal base to 
establish TNCs liability is situations where it is possible to prove the accrued benefit 
from alleged human rights violations and to measure it in monetary terms. It also pursue 
the immediate goal of indigenous plaintiffs in that of imposing direct accountability on 
TNCs; minimizing the power asymmetry and establishing balanced relations between the 
defendant and indigenous plaintiffs which gives them some form of legal recognition of 
their equal standing; and it has deterrence rational that coincides with indigenous 
peoples’ aspirations to protect their lands.280 Nevertheless, due to the inherent limitations 
of monetary scales to most of the losses sustained by indigenous peoples, and practical 
difficulties to meet the standards of unjust enrichment claims by indigenous plaintiffs; 
this approach remains less attractive and inefficient. 
4.4. Private Law Approach 
 
In the absence of effective and efficient public law, private law is advocated as an 
alternative basis of TNCs human rights liability. Host states are capable of protecting the 
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interest and human rights of their peoples through injecting human rights clauses in their 
foreign bilateral or multilateral investment contracts or other agreements of similar nature 
is the idea here. States can include human rights clauses in such agreements that might 
provide for “either a financial penalty of the company or allow the state to sue the 
company in the event of violation, or which, at a minimum, require an international 
arbitrator to take human rights consideration in to account as part of their assessment.”281  
 
The private laws approach can best serve those prudent TNCs who wish to contract for 
compliance with basic human rights standards, and as Alford – Associate Professor of 
Law at Pepperdine University School of Law, California – argued it can “… create 
opportunities to impose human rights obligation on contractors, vendors and 
suppliers.”282 However, it extremely relies upon host states’ ability to enforce obligations 
through contracts and for doing so bring back all the limitations of states-based approach 
discussed under this chapter 4.1. It is also embedded with other legal obstacles that: 
 
First, the very theory of contract presumes equal status of parties in the contract so that 
the terms and conditions may not be influenced by. Nevertheless, host states and 
TNCs/home states are in asymmetrical economic power relationship that the terms and 
conditions of contracts often happened to favor the interest of TNCs. For instance, in the 
Chad-Cameron pipeline project there was a “Convention of Establishment” which 
intended to serve as a legal base of the project and provided the list of inapplicable laws. 
However, it has been criticized that: “it imposes very little, if any, legal responsibility [on 
the TNCs] for any impact their activity may have on the people and living environments 
of Chad and Cameroon.”283   
 
Second, with regard to human rights of indigenous peoples where most states have shown 
little incentive/less political interest to recognize such rights and/or even in some cases 
deny the very existence of the people; it is hard to considered states as diligent guardians 
of indigenous peoples human rights;  
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Third, as is often the case, most host states in the developing world are implicated 
themselves in alleged violations,284 and it would be absurd to look for contractual 
remedies from the same complicit states;  
 
Fourth, contrary to the very domain of human rights under public law, the contractual 
approach will bring human rights to the category of private law and would left it to the 
bargaining power of interest groups, i.e., states and TNCs. Besides, by leaving human 
rights to compete with other economic interests such as the high demand for FDI, profit 
maximization or at least cost minimization factors; this approach, in practical terms, 
commoditized human rights and goes contrary to their inalienable nature;  
 
Last but not least, the very binding nature of such investment agreements is limited to the 
contracting parties. Hence, indigenous people claimants cannot invoke any of the human 
rights obligations from the agreement unless they are initially included as parties to the 
contracts or mentioned as third party beneficiaries. Due to these and other limitations,285 
these approach also remains far from effective. 
 
To conclude, the long years of injustice in indigenous peoples history has proven that 
states are not as such trustworthy as far as the protection of indigenous peoples human 
rights is concerned. States’ not only lack the political will but their capability to regulate 
the human rights impact of TNCs is also in question. The increased attention of the UN 
treaty bodies and regional mechanisms on regulating corporate impact on human rights is 
a proof of the growing concern that “states either do not fully understand or are not 
always able or willing to fulfill this duty.”286 Hence, indirect approach of liability does 
not work and there is no direct human rights obligation on TNCs under international law. 
On the other hand, the existing alternative ways of achieving TNCs liability through 
extraterritorial legislations such as ATCA, unjust enrichment claims or private law 
approach have series impediments which keep them far away from being effective and 
efficient. 
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CHAPTER 5. EMERGING REGULATORY REGIMES  
 
The increasing risk of violations in the absence of effective and efficient mechanism of 
establishing TNCs liability will apparently spark a question that what the international 
community is doing to close this loop hole of the existing international law. It is in this 
issue this chapter centered.  
 
Since the 1970s, numerous soft-laws, voluntary and self-regulations, and social initiatives 
have developed by corporations, NGOs, and in some cases by governments and 
international organizations concerned on the issue of TNCs international human rights 
obligations. It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine in detail the whole emerging 
regulatory regimes and initiatives. However, as different regulatory mechanisms 
proposed at different levels and by different stakeholders, the situation of indigenous 
peoples who disproportionately sustain TNCs human rights damages left behind. This 
chapter, thus, briefly analyzes the most remarkable emerging regulatory regimes 
primarily to indicate the missing link between indigenous peoples human rights and 
TNCs human rights liability in these growing legal frameworks, second, to identify the 
notable weaknesses of such regulatory regimes, and then it will indicate the general 
inadequacy of the existing mechanisms in imposing human rights liability on TNCs.  
5.1. Soft-Law Developments 
5.1.1. The OECD Guidelines  
 
The OECD – a body of thirty relatively affluent nations which include most of the home 
states of the major TNCs287 – has come up with its own Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises [hereinafter OECD Guidelines]  in 1976 since then modified several times 
until 2000.288 The guidelines were intended to facilitate trade and FDI among member 
countries, and hence human rights protection was not in their very purpose.289 However, 
the Revised Guidelines stipulate general human rights obligations on TNCs to “[r]espect 
the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host 
                                                 
287 OECD is also adopted by non-affluent states such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Israel, Lativia 
and Slovakia. See De Schutter. 2006: 4 
288 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Text, Commentary and Clarification. 2001. 
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governments’ international obligations and commitments.”290 The Guidelines reference 
to international human rights obligations of host states is criticized as leaving a 
tremendous gap in human rights protection because “not all countries have adopted all 
human rights treaties and even if they have may unable or unwilling to enforce them.”291 
The Guidelines also give a general recommendation that “[e]nterprises should […] 
engage in adequate and timely communication and consultation with the communities 
directly affected by the environmental, health and safety policies of the enterprise and by 
their implementation.”292 While indigenous peoples can benefit from this provision, it has 
minimized their rights to communication and consultation rather than free prior and 
informed consent which gives the people the right to say no. 
  
Even if the Guidelines revised many times until 2000, they remained general referring to 
the human rights of affected peoples, and hence failed to provide specific protection to 
indigenous peoples human rights. Moreover, while the Revised Guidelines have 
expanded their jurisdiction to all enterprises incorporated in OECD countries wherever 
they operate, they explicitly mention their voluntary and not legally enforceable nature on 
either OECD governments or OECD-based corporations. The Guidelines, thus, merely 
represent OECD governments’ political commitment to support corporate conduct and 
reflect their aspirations and values.293  
  
The Guidelines have also no formal enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. 
However, it is possible to bring a complaint to the attention of a National Contact Point 
or the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises for non-
judicial review – advisory, consultative and clarification procedures.294 The Guidelines 
praised by some as “the most successful multilateral instruments to date.”295 
Nevertheless, despite their lack of sensitivity to indigenous peoples human rights, some 
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legal scholars like Deva criticized the Guidelines as “really only moral requests and are 
no better than the Codes of conduct adopted by many MNCs.” 296  
5.1.2. The ILO Tripartite Declaration  
 
The ILO has a tradition of pursuing consensus between business, labor rights and 
indigenous people human rights. Almost simultaneously with OECD, ILO has adopted 
the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social 
Policy [hereinafter the Tripartite Declaration] in 1976 and later revised in 2000. As 
stipulated in its preamble the Tripartite Declaration intended to “encourage the positive 
contribution which multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress 
and to minimize and resolve the difficulties to which their various operations may give 
rise.”297  
  
The ILO has developed a system of questioner and survey to monitor implementation of 
the Tripartite Declaration by governments, employees, workers and TNCs.298 
Enforcement is, thus, more a matter of discrete persuasion by the officials of both bodies 
or of public embarrassment through the media. However, as argued by De Schutter – 
Prof. of human rights law at University of Louvain, Belgium, and at the College of 
Europe, Natolin – the Tripartite Declaration has high moral value due its adoption by 
consensus.299 It has also a structured complaint procedure, involving a standing 
committee on multinational enterprise empowered to investigate and make specific 
findings of code violation by corporations but with no power of sanction or monitoring 
process.300 The Tripartite Declaration has specific references to the UDHR and other ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998).301 However, it failed 
to address other areas of human rights including its convention on indigenous peoples 
(ILO-169). Hence, like the OECD guidelines the ILO Tripartite Declaration remains less 
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concerned on the special situation of indigenous peoples human rights, and tend to be 
inspirational with no legal force or even power of market coercion.302
5.1.3. The Draft UN Code of Conduct on TNCs 
 
The Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations [hereinafter the Draft 
Code of Conduct] was introduced in 1990 to govern TNCs activity in host states. It 
however, has failed to be adopted or otherwise put into effect for lack of agreement 
between developed and developing countries, particularly, on reference to international 
law and the standards of treatment for TNCs included in it.303  
  
The Draft Code of Conduct provided obligations inter alia that TNCs shall respect the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in states where they operate. It also put general 
rules including respect to human rights, and respect for local laws and traditions which 
may include respect for indigenous peoples customs and culture. The draft code, 
however, has been criticized in its generality.304 Its shortcoming is also emphasized by 
failing to provide any enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance.  
5.1.4. The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of TNCs  
 
In August 2003 the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights adopted the UN Norms. The Norms require TNCs to “promote, secure the 
fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect and protect” human rights “[w]ithin their respective 
spheres of activity and influence.”305 While the phrase “sphere of activity and influence” 
was intended to be expression of limitations of TNCs human rights liability to their 
capacity and competence; the norms seem to impose equal standards of human rights 
expectation with that of states. The SRSG, thus, criticized such standards as “a burden it 
cannot sustain on its own”, and he commented that “the Norms end up by imposing 
higher obligations on corporations than states.”306  
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The UN Norms are non-binding developments but with improved status from the earlier 
similar soft-law initiatives such as the ILO Tripartite Declaration, and the OECD 
Guidelines due to inter alia its intention of imposing human rights obligation on both 
states and TNCs, and inclusion of implementation provisions. The Norms require TNCs 
to adopt the provisions into their contracts with suppliers, distributors, licensees and 
others.307 They also envisage enforceability of the norms by “national and/or 
international tribunals, pursuant to national and international laws.”308  
  
Moreover, the Norms are considered as comprehensive list of obligations drawn with 
reference to the UN Charter, UDHR and other international treaties which give them 
more accepted basis of human rights in general, and a jus cogens status for some human 
rights.309 The Norms set forth six basic categories of rights or duties, i.e., the right to 
equal opportunity and non-discriminatory treatment; the right to security of persons; the 
rights of workers; respect for national sovereignty and human rights; consumer protection 
duties; and environmental protection obligations.310  
  
While the Norms are remarkable steps in the effort towards TNCs human rights liability; 
the Norms being drafted in similar fashion with the former soft-law initiatives failed to 
address the special situation of indigenous peoples human rights and the TNCs business 
operation in indigenous land and territory. The UN Norms being intended to be binding, 
or in its current soft-law status and aspiration of comprehensivety, their lack of concern 
for indigenous human rights shows how far these rights are forgotten in the international 
agenda of corporate human rights liability.  
5.2. Voluntary Initiatives  
Besides international and intergovernmental efforts to develop soft laws, other voluntary 
initiatives and self-regulations are also developed at different levels. Apparently these 
initiatives have no legal status; nevertheless, as commented by Ruggie, “they may have 
legal consequences.”311
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5.2.1. The UN Global Compact  
 
At the 1999 World Economic Forum Conference, held in Davos, Switzerland, the former 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan introduced the UN Global Compact [hereafter the 
Compact]. The Compact consists of ten (initially nine) principles derived from the 
UDHR, ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at work (1998), the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), and the UN Convention Against 
Corruption (2003).312 The Compact states that businesses should (1) “support and respect 
the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights […] within their sphere of 
influence”, (2) ”make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses”, (3) ”uphold 
the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining”, (4) eliminate “all forms of forced and compulsory labor”, (5) abolish child 
labor, (6) eliminate “discrimination in respect to employment and occupation”, (8) 
“undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility”, (9) “encourage 
the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies”, and (10) “work 
against all forms of corruption, including extortion and bribery.”313
 
As of 12 December 2007, 1890 companies – with 250 and more full-time employees – 
have acceded to the Global Compact.314 Being a pure voluntary initiative, however, 
TNCs who acceded to the Compact have only moral obligations to embrace, support and 
enact within their spheres of influence the ten principles and they have to report annually 
on the initiatives they have taken to operationalize these principles which will be shared 
in public.315 Thus, some companies may have acceded merely for public relations 
purposes and their participation may not mean any real commitment to the compact nor a 
change in their human rights behaviors.  
 
The Compact also lacks sensitivity towards indigenous peoples human rights. While the 
scope of the obligation under Principle 1 is explained as to include inter alia the 
obligation to “prevent the forcible displacement of individuals, groups or communities” 
and “protect the economic livelihood of local communities”,316 the actual ten principles 
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do not specifically address the human rights of indigenous peoples, nor do they 
emphasize general human rights principles as affected communities. The Secretary 
General has simply asked world business signatories to “support and respect the 
protection of internationally proclaimed human rights within their sphere of influence.” 
317 Such statements are too vague to adequately protect indigenous peoples human rights 
or the rights of other affected groups.  
5.2.2. Corporate Self-regulations 
 
A number of TNCs have developed codes of conduct as a response to responsible 
business move advocated since the 1970s. Not only TNCs other non-state actors 
including business entities, trade groups and NGOs have also adopted codes of conduct. 
Codes of conduct are voluntary standards set to serve as basis of self-commitment and 
hence there is no exposure for legal penalties in the event of failure to abide by such 
codes.318 From the general trend, the codes of conduct cover eight broad areas of labor, 
environment, consumer protection, bribery, competition, information disclosure, science 
and technology, and taxation.319 However, labor rights and environmental standards are 
the most common issues covered by codes.320  
 
Due to the moral obligation or ethical approach taken by companies, the rapid expansion 
of codes of conduct does not show remarkable progress in incorporating human rights 
phrases. Until 2008 only 152 companies have taken steps in adopting formal company 
policy statements explicitly referring to human rights.321 The findings of a study made on 
Transnational Oil Companies (TNOCs) involved in upstream exploration and production 
activities in developing countries to measure the move towards the human rights agenda 
showed that only one-fourths of the TNOCs are concerned with ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (CSR) in general terms.322 CSR being a vague concept cannot always 
connected to human rights concerns. For this reason a specific data analysis made to find 
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how many TNOCs in the sample has explicit mention of human rights in their policies 
revealed as small as 11 %.323  
 
It is also interesting to note the regional disparity on human rights sensitivity of TNOCs 
based on their country of incorporation. Accordingly, only 15 % of US based TNOCs 
have explicit human rights agenda in their policies which makes them less concerned 
compared to the 28 % representation of their European fellows until 2000.324  Despite the 
lack of comprehensivety and enough regional or even country level numerical 
representations, the sample of TNOCs covered in the study include big leading 
companies in terms of their revenue, capital investment and business reputation, and even 
expected to play a role model if they adopt CSR policies. 325  Hence, despite its limitation 
the sample gives some evidence that there is very slow response/high tolerance of big 
TNCs, engaged in the oil industry sector operating in the south, for the human rights 
initiatives in the corporate sphere. 
 
On the other hand, due to companies ‘make-up’ the inclusion of the general human rights 
clauses in TNCs’ codes of conduct may not reveal a real change in behavior. TNCs may 
make-up human rights in their policies but at the same time avoid any commitment by 
avoiding specific reference to international human rights instruments such as UDHR, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, ILO Conventions and the like. Moreover, as is often the case the 
phrase ‘human rights’ in codes of conduct refers to labor rights.326 Hence, TNCs’ codes 
of conduct are not so promising to be basis of TNCs human rights liability. Besides, 
codes being voluntary, self-regulatory, little transparent and highly inconsistent; the 
influence they will put on corporations to respect human rights is questionable.327 It will 
also invoke a problem of ‘free-riders’ which will disadvantage ‘rights-friendly’ TNCs.328
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These being common problems in the general human rights agenda, indigenous human 
rights have got the least attention in companies’ codes of conduct. While many TNCs 
have no mention of indigenous human rights in their codes, some just mention indigenous 
people without mention of the word ‘right’.329  
 
Despite the voluntary nature of the codes, there are two lines of arguments developed in 
their enforceability. First, it is not possible to say that codes are entirely unenforceable in 
law and their development is irrelevant; and second, codes might contribute to the 
development of quasi-binding norms which may lead to their legal manifestations.330 The 
codes may have some advantages of imposing positive impact on the promotion, 
protection and realization of human rights in TNCs’ spheres of influence, influencing 
host states to adopt human rights policies and brining companies’ cultural change for 
human rights.331 The lack of specific concern for indigenous peoples human rights and 
less reflection in companies codes of conduct, thus, would bring no change of behavior in 
this regard. 
5.3. Social Initiatives 
 
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss social developments. However, it would be 
wise to acknowledge the continued effort of several human rights NGOs, consumers, 
workers, investors and the media. These social groups can influence TNCs through 
product boycotts, selective purchasing, protests, naming and shaming etc.332 NGOs often 
employ different strategies including encouraging standard setting through state action; 
influencing TNCs human rights behaviors through certification; raising awareness; 
targeting campaigns; marshalling shame and so on. Still these too are inadequate and 
largely restricted in scope to labor and environmental practices,333 rather than indigenous 
human rights issues. The media can also play a significant role in exposing human rights 
abusive TNCs for the general public and consumers; but its effectiveness is limited to 
free-press countries where journalists are not at high risk of death or detention. 
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To conclude, to date while a number of efforts have been made ranging from soft-laws to 
voluntary initiatives evoked by big intergovernmental organization such as the UN to 
individual TNC’s codes of conduct and social initiatives by NGOs; none of them can be 
served as effective and efficient tools to bring TNCs liability neither to the general human 
rights violations nor to the specific case of indigenous peoples human rights abuses for at 
least three basic reasons.  
  
First the human rights obligations of TNCs are expressed in such general terms with no 
significant reference to specific human rights instruments. Second, they all are voluntary 
initiatives subject to moral values for their enforceability. The regulatory regimes, in fact, 
have (more or less) little legal value as they impose moral (because they are non-binding) 
and political (because of governments’ involvement) duties which are not directly 
enforceable before any court of law or legal tribunal.334 Third, they have failed to provide 
implementation and monitory mechanisms. Even if some of the international regulatory 
mechanisms such as the OECD Guideline and the ILO Tripartite Declaration have 
enforcement mechanisms, their monitoring bodies do not have either judicial or quasi-
judicial capacity.335 The codes of conduct would have got enforceability, at least at the 
national level, indirectly as a failure to meet industry standards of conduct or breach of 
contract or as abuse of certification schemes etc where they had implied or expressed 
terms of obedience to international legal instruments.336 Still it will depend on the 
willingness and capability of host states. 
  
It should, nevertheless, be noted that neither the fact of non-enforceability nor their 
lack/lowest degree of sensitivity to indigenous peoples human rights render these 
instruments worthless. Rather as highlighted by Joseph - Director for the Castan Centre 
for Human Rights Law - “… the standards therein can be useful points of reference for 
national governments that wish to impose binding domestic duties on TNCs, for NGOs 
seeking ammunition to campaign against certain TNCs, and for corporations adopting 
and implementing internal codes of conduct.”337 These norms are also the elaborations of 
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the newly growing international human rights paradigm and the expansion of already 
recognized basic human rights norms. Hence, as suggested by Stephens, Professor of 
Law at Rutgers - Camden, the fact that the obligations are illustrated in voluntary codes 
of conduct would not undermine the legally obligatory foundations of the norms.338
 
Moreover, despite the soft law nature of the whole initiatives, “it is difficult to imagine a 
corporation arguing that it is not obliged to respect human rights.”339 On the other hand, 
according to the law-making trend within the system of the UN, moral obligations could 
be transferred to binding legal norms by developing consciences grown through long 
years of international practices and opinio juris. Hence, today’s soft-laws could be 
strengthened to hard-laws through customary international law as is the case in most 
provisions of the UDHR. 
 
Nonetheless, unlike the general case of human rights situations where the whole problem 
is about voluntarism, efficiency and enforceability of existing regulatory mechanisms, the 
issue on indigenous peoples human rights is on the very absence of adequate 
consideration in the regulatory frameworks. Hence, the current international law is 
overwhelmed for lack of sensitivity to situations of indigenous peoples human rights 
violations by TNCs.  
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
I have been analyzing so far the status of indigenous peoples human rights under the 
existing system of international human rights law, the violations of such rights by TNCs 
and the regulatory challenge that states alone are not capable of protecting the human 
rights of their people from being infringed by TNCs and the absence of direct liability of 
TNCs under international law. Despite such situations, the newly emerged regulatory 
regimes remain non-sensitive to indigenous peoples human rights, minimized to 
voluntarism and also lack the relevant enforcement mechanisms.  
 
Taking into account all these problematic situations this chapter draws conclusions and 
moves in questioning what can be done or what is the appropriate legal regime in this 
regard. To this end the chapter attempts to give recommendations based on different 
levels of time. First it proposes general policy considerations which need to be taken in 




Human rights being inherent rights of all humans expressed in general terms addressing 
to all individuals regardless of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”340 However, through 
time, these general human rights considerations proved to be insufficient and ineffective 
to protect the rights of certain groups of peoples such as women and children.  Hence, 
human rights addressing to specific groups developed, but remained individual rights. 
The long years of injustice, dispossession and discrimination faced by indigenous peoples 
across the world invoke the need to go beyond individual human rights protection to 
collective entitlements of human rights.  
 
Indigenous peoples used the top-bottom approach for their human rights recognition. 
Accordingly, many international human rights instruments including those milestone twin 
covenants (ICCPR & ICESCR) have happened to have some fundamental human rights 
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phrases that are particularly relevant to indigenous peoples as collective beings. The 
common article I on the rights to self-determination is the point here.  
 
Moreover, indigenous peoples rights to land and cultural rights are well protected by very 
significant, due to its legally binding nature and alleged customary international law 
status, international human rights convention No. 169 of ILO. Very recently, the adoption 
of the UNDRIP has further proved the need for the special protection of such peoples 
because of their ‘indignity’ and clarifies their claims under international law. Despite 
their diversity, thus, indigenous peoples of the world are protected in international law 
under the umbrella of ‘indigenous peoples human rights’ as a single identity.  
 
This 21st century is the era of globalization. Boundaries have less values, many states 
have opened their door for investment and the global arm of TNCs has stretched long 
enough to reach the global southern nations including the forest and jungles of 
indigenous peoples. Numerous TNCs have implicated in human rights violations and 
accused of increasing the vulnerability of some groups including children, women and 
indigenous peoples.  
 
Indigenous people happened to carry the disproportionate cost of human rights due to 
their special attachment to their environment and their lack of recognition within the 
majority state system. Particularly those TNCs engaged in the extractive sector have 
posed a particular human right treat on indigenous peoples. Often TNCs pursue their 
projects up on the grant of a concession or contract of similar nature from host states’ 
governments without seeking the free prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples 
living in the area nor do they make any impact assessments. On the other hand, even if 
impact assessments are made they failed to analyze indigenous ways of life as was the 
case in IPP which was meant to improve indigenous peoples life of the Bagali but failed 
to consider their mobile way of life and resulted in dispossession.341  
 
TNCs often raise their policy of ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of a government 
as a defence for failure to act against human rights abuses.342 Nonetheless, they 
implicated in dispossession and displacement of indigenous peoples from their ancestral 
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lands, disturb their traditional way of life which is often the only means of subsistence 
and the basis of their culture, disturb their spiritual attachments, and disrespect their 
sacred sites. These all lead to indigenous cultural extinction and often threatened their 
very well being. TNCs even accrue benefit out of their implication in human rights 
violations through using low technological standards or by avoiding the use of necessary 
technologies as was the case by Texaco in its operation in the Oriente, Ecuador.343  
 
The situation has different face in the context of developing nations where let alone the 
concern for indigenous peoples human rights the general human rights agenda itself has 
got little weight due to other detrimental factors such as debit crisis and poor governance. 
Irrespective of the existence of legislative recognitions of their indignity including their 
rights, indigenous peoples in the developing world has passed trough tremendous human 
rights violations by TNCs. The case of the Subanon in Phillipness who are 
constitutionally recognized as indigenous peoples and their land right has recognition in a 
separate Act can be a good example here.344
 
Despite the growing power and global reach of TNCs and their complicity in human 
rights violations the current international law remains handicapped. The existing 
international law failed to provide effective and efficient mechanism of imposing human 
rights liability on TNCs. Even if some arguments have developed on the basis of UDHR, 
ICCPR & ICESCR, TNCs have neither direct human rights liability under international 
law nor their acts are attributable to states. Rather they are further protected under the 
corporate law doctrines of legal personality and limited liability which served as 
additional legal grounds for parent TNCs to escape liability for any acts of their 
subsidiaries or affiliates. 
 
The classical international law mechanism of regulating non-state actors indirectly 
through states-based regulatory regime also remained ineffective not only because most 
host states are implicated in such alleged human rights violations but also lack the 
capability to control TNCs which are relatively powerful, at least economically speaking, 
than most host states which often fail under the category of ‘weak governance zones’ -  
                                                 
343 See the discussion on chapter 3 of this thesis, pp. 35 
344 See the discussion on chapter 3 of this thesis, pp. 37-38 
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“areas in which the territorial (or host) state is unwilling or unable to exercise its 
authority.”345
 
On the other hand, while the only strong and judicial rich extraterritorial legislation from 
home states is ATCA, it has suffered from series procedural impediments including 
‘forum non-conveniense’. ATCA has also logistic impediments such as the cost of 
traveling abroad for indigenous plaintiffs and their witnesses, staying abroad or going 
back to attend hearings, finding advocates, and so on. ATCA is a relevant legislation 
which currently lights a little hope of redress for human rights victims of TNCs, but even 
putting aside its limitations ATCA alone can not fill the corporate human rights liability 
vacuum left by international law. 
 
Other alternative basis of legal liability such as the private law approach relies on host 
states capability to negotiate their peoples’ human rights in their investment contracts, 
and it undermines the very domain of human rights. Taking into account the lack of 
political interest to give recognition to indigenous peoples, it would not be sound to rely 
on host states’ to give priority for indigenous peoples rights with the risk of chilling 
TNCs investment. The unjust enrichment claims approach also remains less attractive and 
inefficient due to inter alia the inherent limitations of monetary scales to most of the 
losses sustained by indigenous peoples, and practical difficulties to meet the standards of 
unjust enrichment claims by indigenous plaintiffs. 
 
Different regulatory regime and voluntary initiatives have developed at different levels of 
stakeholders from intergovernmental organizations as big as the UN including the OECD 
and ILO to individual TNCs. These all efforts are positive steps in reflecting the growing 
consensus that TNCs human rights behaviour must be regulated, and in highlighting both 
the possibility and urgency of regulating the human rights behaviour of TNCs. However, 
they all remain aspirational with no legally binding status and effective power of 
enforcement. Furthermore, regarding indigenous peoples human rights, they all are 
infected with the same disease of forgetting these people from their agenda.  
 
Traditionally, since states were the only powerful actors, human rights obligations were 
presumed in such power asymmetry. The existing international law, thus, could not find 
                                                 
345 Ruggie. 2006b: 3 
 - 85 -  
enough room to accommodate the new powerful transnational actors and to give adequate 
and effective legal means of redress for human rights victims of TNCs. It puts a 
contemporary challenge on the essence of the international human rights framework 
which aimed at protecting the potential victim from the powerful offender. On the other 
hand, for lack of specific consideration of indigenous peoples human rights in attempted 
regulatory mechanisms, the contemporary international law left indigenous peoples with 
little means of redress. 
6.2. Policy Implications 
 
It has been indicated that TNCs not only are free from direct human rights obligations 
under international law, but the indirect state-based mechanisms are also failed to 
effectively regulate the human rights detrimental acts of TNCs. Hence, any policy 
implication should follow a couple of approaches. On the one hand it should focus on 
sharpening existing international laws and other regulatory regimes which include 
pressing governments to hold TNCs accountable when they implicated in human 
rights violations. On the other hand, a means of holding TNCs directly liable for their 
complicity in serious human rights violations should be sought. Both approaches are 
considered as follows. 
6.2.1. General Considerations 
6.2.1.1. Binding International Human Rights Law on TNCs 
 
The alarming rate of human rights violations, including indigenous and community 
rights, followed by TNCs business activities despite all the regulatory and voluntary 
efforts made in all possible areas is a current challenge for the whole international human 
rights framework. It is time to weight the devastating human rights impacts of TNCs and 
to ensure the observance of the existing international human rights norms by TNCs. To 
this end, based on existing standards of basic human rights, labor rights, consumer 
protection, environmental concern, rights of local communities, and indigenous peoples 
human rights strengthening TNCs human rights liability into binding obligations is 
necessary.  
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The legal status of TNCs under international law is a notable obstacle in this approach as 
direct human rights liability on corporations is considered as a change in the very 
foundation of international law.346 Nevertheless, it is possible to raise the following 
decisive arguments. First, as a clear reflection of the UDHR that “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;”347 
human rights are protected in such a way regardless of the identity of the actor whether 
states, natural persons or juridical persons. Hence, the very purpose of international 
human rights law is protection of victims irrespective of the identity of the actors from 
which the rights have to be protected. This will lead to the threshold questions that 
whether TNCs are capable of violating international law. 
 
Until Nuremberg Tribunal states were considered as the only entities that are capable of 
violating human rights. The Nuremberg Tribunal, however, for the first time established 
corporations’ capability to uphold and violate international law by declaring I.G. Farben, 
a Germen Industry, had committed international war crime even if it failed prosecution 
merely for lack of jurisdiction on legal persons.348  Later in 1998, the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) incorporated provisions which entitle 
ICC to assume jurisdiction over legal persons (including TNCs) “when the crimes 
committed were committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or 
representatives.”349 Nonetheless, for time constraint, it fails to be adopted and the revised 
version has limited the court’s jurisdiction to natural persons.350  
 
Thus, taking into consideration the very purpose of international law which is protecting 
human rights from those who have power and TNCs being new powerful global actors 
capable of violating international human rights, putting aside TNCs from the realm of 
international human rights liability would not make sense. Rather it would affect the very 
creditability and relevancy of international law in the current context of changing global 
world.  
 
                                                 
346 See Vázquez. 2004-2005: 46-54; see also the theory of legal personality and the legal status of TNCs in 
Jägers. 1999: 259-270 
347 UDHR. 1948. Art. 5 
348 See Bratspies.  pp.13-16  
349 Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court. 1994. Art. 23 (5) quoted in Wilson. 2006: 49 
350 See Bratspies. pp. 22; see also Clapham. 2006: 245-246 
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Second, law is basically a reflection of society values and hence elastic to accommodate 
new actors and new values. For instance, those international conventions dealing with 
women rights, rights of homosexuals are deviations from the traditional values of society 
and are reflections of modern theory of ‘equality’ and ‘diversity’. On the other hand the 
idea of ‘indigenous peoples human rights’ is also a new approach under international law 
which primarily shares sovereignty among states. Hence, international law has been and 
should be evolutionary reflecting societies’ present values and needs with regard to 
human rights. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Third, there are some international conventions that impose direct duties on TNCs in their 
current status as private actors such as the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damages (1975) and the Convention on Civil Liability for Damages Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment (1993). Recently some criminal conventions 
have also emerged imposing direct criminal liability on corporations such as International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2000) and Basel 
Convention on the Control of Trans-boundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their 
Disposal (2004).351 Besides, some international and special tribunals such as the Seabed 
Dispute Chamber, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunals, and the United Nations 
Claims Commission have allowed TNCs to bring claims.352 Some regional human rights 
instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, on the other hand 
protect the rights to the ‘peaceful enjoyment of their possession’, ‘rights to free speech’, 
‘rights to fair trial’ and ‘rights to privacy’ of corporations under Protocol I, Art 1, 10, 6 & 
8, respectively.353  
 
These all instances of growing legislations and jurisprudence indicate the possible 
extension of direct international human rights responsibility on TNCs, if and when states 
consent to it, for limited purposes without the need of changing the current international 
law status of TNCs. As pointed out by the SRSG “there are no inherent conceptual 
barriers to states deciding to hold corporations directly responsible.”354 In my view, the 
question is a matter of clarifying borders of human rights responsibly of states and TNCs, 
                                                 
351 See the detail in Bratspies. pp.30-31 
352 See the detail in Kinley & Tadaki, 2003-2004:946-947 
353 See the general approach on corporations as human right victims in Addo. 2006: 187-196  
354 Ruggie. 2006a. Parag. 65 
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while both are subject to it. If I endorse Kinley & Tadaki here “it is neither necessary nor 
desirable for TNCs to possess full legal personality on a par with states.”355 Hence, while 
states remain key players under international law as “a party to intergovernmental forums 
or international instruments”; TNCs can assume limited international entity status to 
exercise some rights such as “the right to sue and be sued, the ability to asset a right”, and 
to assume some human rights obligations and to stand in some judicial forums.356  
 
Thus, there is no inherent limitation on international law in imposing direct human rights 
obligation on TNCs. Rather the obstacle is in achieving the political will of states who are 
afraid of losing their power of sovergnity. It should be clear that, even if TNCs assume 
direct human rights liability under international, their liability would not be equated with 
that of states, and the later will remain primary actors. Hence, while direct human rights 
liability on TNCs is desirable, it will not significantly undermine the legal sovereignty of 
states under international law. Neither this would shift the legal status of TNCs under 
international law from private business actors to public institutions.  
6.2.1.2. Reconsidering Existing Regulatory Regimes   
 
As has been indicated under chapter five, lack of sensitivity to indigenous peoples human 
rights is one of the main weaknesses of emerging regulatory regimes from the UN Norms 
to TNCs codes of conduct. Hence, such regulatory and voluntary initiatives need to be 
reconsidered in line with the human rights concern of indigenous peoples incorporated in 
international legal instruments. They all need to include human rights clauses specifically 
addressing to indigenous peoples and need to make reference to certain international legal 
instruments relevant to indigenous peoples including the recently adopted UNDRIP.  
   
In this regard, the move of the UN Norms was very remarkable. Nonetheless, it remained 
in commentary and failed to reflect in the body of the Norms. The commentary is quoted 
here to serve as a model of indigenous peoples human rights safeguarding clauses that 
need to be included in any up-coming binding international law or revised version of 
existing norms. The Commentary on Art. 10 of the UN Norms states that: 
                                                 
355 See Kinley & Tadaki. 2003-2004: 945 
356 See Kinley & Tadaki. 2003-2004: 946; see also the possibility of limiting legal personality to certain 
purposes in Jägers. 1999:261-263                                                                                                                                                           
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(c) Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall respect the 
rights of local communities affected by their activities and the rights of 
[I]ndigenous peoples and communities consistent with international human rights 
standards such as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention. 1989 (No. 169).  
They shall particularly respect the rights of [I]ndigenous peoples and similar 
communities to own, occupy, develop, control, protect and use their lands, other 
natural resources, and cultural and intellectual property. 
They shall also respect the principle of free, prior and informed consent of the 
[I]ndigenous peoples and communities to be affected by their development 
projects. 
Indigenous peoples and communities shall not be deprived of their own means of 
subsistence, nor shall they be removed from lands which they occupy in a 
manner inconsistent with Convention No. 169. 
Further, they shall avoid endangering the health, environment, culture and 
institutions of [I]ndigenous peoples and communities in the context of projects, 
including road building in or near [I]ndigenous peoples and communities. 
Transnational corporations and other business enterprises shall use particular care 
in situation in which [I]ndigenous lands, resources, or rights thereto have not 
been adequately demarcated or defined.357
 
These all are existing rights already recognized by different international human rights 
instruments as discussed under chapter of two of these thesis and need to be respected by 
all actors including states and any non-state entities including TNCs. Hence, any legal 
instrument which attempts to impose human rights liability on TNCs need to consider 
such human rights of indigenous peoples. 
6.2.1.3. A comprehensive List of Minimum Human Rights Standards  
 
Despite the on-going debate on whether TNCs human rights responsibility can best be 
achieved through regulatory regime or voluntarism,358 the whole package of trends since 
the 1970s proves the need to combine both. Besides, it might take years until states reach 
consensus on the provisions of binding regulations.359 Hence, complementary to 
developing binding regulations, a comprehensive list of minimum human rights standards 
that TNCs need to observe should be developed even if at the level of voluntarism.  
 
Currently despite the soft-law standards and individual TNCs codes of conduct, there are 
also a number of voluntary guidelines such as Social Accountability 8000 on labor 
related standards,360 the Ethical Trading Initiatives on environment, social and economic 
                                                 
357 Commentary on the UN Norms. 2003. Point E, Art. 10 
358 See, for instance, Wawryk. 2003: 53-78 
359 Wawryk. 2003: 56 
360 Social Accountability 8000. On-line available at: www.sa-intl.org  
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concerns,361 the Global Sullivan Principles,362 and others. Despite their lack of 
comprehensivity, the number of existing guidelines might confuse TNCs which 
guidelines to follow and difficult for civil society organizations to point out non-
observance.  
 
Hence, comprehensive human rights standard settings including indigenous peoples 
human rights clauses can help in defining human rights expectations that TNCs need to 
observe and hence will contribute significantly to the development of consistent practice 
in this regard. It can also ease enforcement through public disclosure in case of failure. 
How to develop such instrument? Who is capable to come up with such instrument, i.e., 
whether it should be the responsibility of the UN, WB, or the WTO,363 and which human 
rights standards should be included are open debates which need further analysis beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
 
In spite of such a debate, it would be practically relevant and will have high authentic 
value if it can be developed within the system of the UN. First the UN has been working 
on the issue of TNCs liability for human rights since the 1970s and has already tried to 
come up with some regulatory mechanisms even if they failed to be successful. It has also 
mandated the SRSG on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, who has already gone far in analyzing such 
issues and TNCs expectations. Second, while human rights protection are one of the 
primary goals of the UN; indigenous issues have already get attention in the UN 
framework through WGIP, UNPFII and also the special rapporteur on the issue of 
indigenous peoples human rights. Hence, despite their normative value, for deep 
understanding, practice and trend it would be more effective if such standards develop 
within the UN system.  
 
The SRSG very recently reflected that:  
… when the challenge we face is imposing human rights obligations on states 
there is no “higher” expression of authority than international legal norms and 
instruments that we can turn to. Hence, our options are limited. In contrast, 
corporations are subject to multiple sources of authority higher than 
                                                 
361 See Ethical Trading Initiatives. On-line available at: www.ethicaltrade.org
362 See Global Sullivan Principles. On-line available at: www.thesullivanfoundation.org  
363 See, for instance, Kinley & Tadaki. 2003-2004: 999-1019 
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themselves, including home and host states, shareholders, broader market 
forces, and their more informal social licenses to operate. All can and need to 
be mobilized in devising an effective response to business-related human rights 
challenges.364  
Hence, it is essential to consider alternative mechanisms of achieving TNCs compliance 
to human rights in general or indigenous peoples human rights in particular at less 
international law reform level within the multiple sources of authority that TNCs may 
abide to. This would serve as transitional measures answering the question that what can 
be done in the mean time until international human right norms or uniform standards 
developed. 
6.2.2. Transitional Measures 
6.2.2.1. Sharpening Indirect Liability 
 
Even if the debate on TNCs human rights liability has moved beyond the responsibility of 
the sates involved, states still remain viable sources of liability. Neither the lack of 
political will nor capability to regulate TNCs will undermine states’ obligation to protect 
the rights of their people from being infringed by any state/non-state actors including 
TNCs. Host states are primarily responsible to safeguard the human rights of their people 
including indigenous peoples human rights in their jurisdictions. In this regard, there are 
three possible areas where the human rights liability of TNCs can be sharpened under the 
jurisdiction of host states.  
 
Primarily host states should refrain themselves from being implicated in human rights 
violations of their people in collision with TNCs. Second, host should negotiate the 
human rights terms under which TNCs can operate in the country, put minimum 
standards of expected human rights behaviors of TNCs and include safeguarding clauses 
in cases of breach of such terms. Third, host states should strengthen the domestic 
regulatory regimes in terms of protective legislations, access to justice system in case of 
abuses and build effective enforcement mechanisms. Here it will be very significant to 
give recognition to indigenous peoples human rights in domestic legislations to increase 
their viability in the state system which will help them to invoke their rights in case of 
violations. 
                                                 
364 Statement of John Ruggie. 2007: 4 
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While all these potential measures can be weaken by host states’, particularly in the 
developing nation, high economic demand, lack of political will and some elites benefits 
from unregulated human rights behaviors of TNCs and other factors; home states most of 
which are from the developed countries possess greater potential. First, home states can 
effectively negotiate human rights terms with their TNCs operating abroad through 
standard settings. In this regard, imposing equal human rights standards both at ‘home 
and Rome’, i.e., in home and host states is advocated.365 However, taking into 
consideration the alternative market for TNCs and developing countries competition to 
attract such investments; the Rome approach can have negative impacts on the economy 
of host states and will ultimately affect the protection of human rights. Hence, minimum 
standards that take into account the basic needs of human rights would be more 
functional in the current situation.  
 
Second, home states have no resource limitation to develop judicial forums for victims of 
their TNCs to satisfy their claims abroad. One should not forget that home stats’ financial 
and more significantly political support have tremendous contribution in enabling TNCs 
over-seas operations.366 Home states should take initiatives in regulating TNCs, hence, 
not merely for the purpose of serving justice and human rights but also for the sake of 
sharing responsibility. Thus, strengthening extra-territorial legislations similar to ATCA 
which assume jurisdiction based on international law can be a viable alternative. 
6.2.2.2. Contractual Empowerment of Indigenous Peoples 
 
Since most of the contractual agreements are between States and TNCs, tort laws or 
unjust enrichment clams are the legal options left for indigenous peoples claimants who 
are victims of TNCs operation. To widen indigenous peoples legal basis for claim of 
justice host states can incorporate arbitration clauses in their contracts specifically 
mentioning indigenous peoples or communities who would be affected by the project as 
third party beneficiaries. In this case since arbitration can be invoked by a third party 
                                                 
365 See the discussion in Deva. 2004b: 502 
366 Home states support their TNC operating abroad in a variety of ways such as through negotiating 
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties, providing political assurance through government export 
credit agencies; private sector financial offers through regional and national financial institutions etc. see 
Suda. 2006: 73-160 
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beneficiary,367 indigenous peoples who are not initially parties to the contract can invoke 
alleged violations of contractual terms against TNCs as third party beneficiaries. 
6.2.2.3. Importing Human Rights Clauses in Codes of Conduct  
 
The current growing TNCs codes of conduct are valuable first step and potential 
complements to other mechanism of accountability. While they are reflections of TNCs’ 
awareness that their human rights behaviors need to be regulated; as argued by Kinley & 
Tadick the codes have also important normative impacts on the development of domestic 
and international laws.368 It is, thus, very important that TNCs codes of conduct include 
clear and adequate reference to indigenous peoples human rights and become specific in 
undertaking human rights obligations through referring to relevant international human 
rights instruments such as the UDHR, ICCPR, ISCESR, ILO-169 or the UNDRIP. The 
reference to specific legal documents has the benefit of strengthening their normative 
power and observance, increased enforceability and help for the development of 
consistent and uniform practice of codes. A clear reference to human rights clauses can 
also help TNCs to negotiate human rights terms in their business dealings with 
contractors, subsidiaries, suppliers, and so on.369 Hence, it would lead towards creating 
conducive business environment where corporations can grow their profits in the long 
run.  
6.2.2.4. Transparent Impact Assessment & Consultation  
 
In general terms, TNCs must carry out a transparent analysis of political and socio-
economic environments, and human rights dimensions of their investment in paying 
particular regard to the human rights situations of local peoples and distinct culture of 
indigenous peoples. As envisaged by the Interim Report of the SRSG, “only four out of 
ten firms indicated that they ‘routinely’ conduct human rights impact assessments of their 
project, and a slightly higher number that they do so ‘occasionally’.”370 Hence, TNCs 
must be encouraged to make such assessments in transparent manner in cooperation with 
civil society organizations’. Prior to the commencement of projects, TNCs should also 
                                                 
367 See in detail the benefits of third party beneficiary in arbitration in Alford. 2007: 35-43 
368 Kinley & Tadick. 2003-2004: 936 
369 Alford. 2007: 29 
370 Ruggie. 2006a. Parag. 35 
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seek consultation with potentially affected communities including indigenous peoples 
with a view of obtaining free, prior and informed consent as envisaged under ILO-169 
and UNDRIP. 
6.2.2.5. New Insight to NGOs and Human Rights Advocates  
 
NGOs can play crucial role as watchdogs and whistle-blowers in protecting indigenous 
peoples human rights from being infringed by TNCs. NGOs as watchdogs can bring to 
the for the particular threat that TNCs have posed on indigenous peoples human rights 
through documenting abuses. Here NGOs need to act as representatives of community 
voice and hence need to refrain from ‘commercializing’ human rights violations.  
 
NGOs can also help to ensure compliance of both states and TNCs for human rights 
standards through documenting and reporting abuses, engaging in responsible business 
dialogues with TNCs, and sharing the experience of TNCs compliance with human 
rights. They can also put significant input in developing minimum standards of behavior 
that TNCs should observe. Some NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Workers 
Rights Consortium have already drafted codes on “Human Rights Principles of 
Companies” and “Model Codes of Conduct”, respectively.371
 
To sum up, the issue of TNCs human rights liability is so complex and connected with 
economic powers, political interest and theoretical obstacles, not to mention practical 
impediments. Many actors from state to international institutions, academia, media, civil 
society organizations, and few prudent corporations are engaged in looking for effective 
and efficient regulatory framework to establish human rights liability of TNCs. As 
mentioned in its very beginning, this thesis has primarily intended to problematize the 
indigenous peoples human rights and TNCs business operation, and then to indicate the 
existing legal gap in the existing system of international law and to show the missing link 
of indigenous peoples human rights in the newly developed initiatives.  
 
Finding a clear-cut solution for this kind of issue is not an easy task as implementation 
might involve political, economical, social and theoretical considerations. Despite such 
admitted difficulties, the aforementioned policy considerations need to be taken and 
                                                 
371 See www.amnesty.org & www.workersrights.org  
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implemented through time at the various levels of stakeholders in cooperation and 
dialogue with indigenous peoples.  
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